Satisficing Negotiation for Resource Allocation with Disputed Resources

Todd K. Moon and Wynn C. Stirling

Satisficing decision making provides a more malleable framework for negotiation than conventional techniques based on optimization of a utility function. In this paper we summarize satisficing decision theory, which provides a mechanism for determining decision options which are "good enough" as as tradeoff between a selectability function and a rejectability function, with an index of caution as a decision control parameter. Single agent satisficing is extended to multi-agent satisficing, by which group rationality can be represented; option vectors for the entire group are obtained as a result of this decision process. Multi-agent satisficing provides the stage upon which negotiation takes place. Negotiation. in this context, is the process by which all agents determine a set of options which are both individually satisficing and jointly satisficing; through the course of negotiation agents can accommodate the needs of the group -- compromise -- through lowering their index of caution. An example is presented of resource allocation with disputed resources.


This page is copyrighted by AAAI. All rights reserved. Your use of this site constitutes acceptance of all of AAAI's terms and conditions and privacy policy.