Verification of Multi-Level Rule-Based Expert Systems

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Abstract
Verification methods and tools developed so far have assumed a very simple model of rule-based expert system (RBES). Current RBES often do not comply this model and require more sophisticated verification techniques. A RBES model including uncertainty and control has been used to analyze four verification issues (inconsistency, redundancy, circularity and useless RB objects), identifying a number of new verification problems. The concepts of labels and environments (deKleer 1986) have been extended to incorporate uncertainty and control information, obtaining the constructs extended-labels and extended-environments. They have been used to express and solve these new verification problems.

1 Introduction
Expert systems (ESs), like any other piece of software, should be verified and validated to assure their correctness and compliance with the user's requirements. Verification is concerned with the correctness of the ES structure, while validation considers the semantical adequacy of the ES output with respect to its input. Little effort has been devoted to ES verification and validation, especially if compared with other aspects of ES design. However, they are mandatory steps to actually guarantee the correctness of the ES structure and the reliability of its behaviour.

In this paper, the problem of verification of rule-based expert systems (RBESs) is considered. Several verifiers for RBESs have been developed in the last ten years. Most of them assume a very simple RBES model, which is far from the advanced capabilities that current shells offer, inside the rule-based paradigm. There is an important gap between available verifier capacities and current RBES requirements. This paper tries to partially fill this gap, developing a verification framework in which features currently present in many RBESs are included.

As new features, the assumed RBES model includes, (i) an uncertainty management system (UMS), and (ii) the existence of control knowledge in the rule base. The UMS causes that RBES deductions are no longer boolean, but weighted by certainty values (cvs). Verification concepts have to be adapted to this new representation. The threshold \( \tau \), able to cut deductions with cvs less than \( \tau \), is a significant element to determine whether or not a fact can be deduced. Control knowledge, implicit or explicit, plays an important role in the RBES behaviour and it should be verified just like domain knowledge. The union of control and domain knowledge is often organized in a hierarchy of levels, each level acting on levels below. In this hierarchy, verification is performed in two steps: (i) considering each level in isolation, and (ii) considering each level against all upper levels acting on it. This hierarchy causes a number of new verification problems, which have not been considered before because of the flatness of the simple RBES model mentioned above.

To check these new verification problems, the concepts of label and environment (introduced by deKleer (deKleer 1986) and used successfully by Ginsberg (Ginsberg 1988) for inconsistency and redundancy checking) have been extended obtaining the new concepts of extended-label and extended-environment (e-labels and e-environments, for short). This extension adds information concerning uncertainty and control that is relevant for verification purposes. For all the RBES objects, their corresponding e-label can be computed. Testing a number of simple relations among e-labels, such as set inclusion or set compatibility, the verification issues can be checked.

2 Related Work
Early verifiers like ONCOCIN rule checker (Suwa, Scott, & Shortliffe 1982) or CHECK (Nguyen et al. 1985), check rule bases for consistency and completeness. They are based on static comparison of rules (except for cycles), and consistency is only partially checked. In (Cragun & Steudel 1987) the same approach is followed with optimized algorithms. Other systems, KB-REDUCER (Ginsberg 1988), COVADIS (Rousset 1988), are more focused on consistency checking computing all different sets of input data supporting a given fact (KB-REDUCER also checks redundancy). Another system (Meseguer 1990) transforms a rule base into a Petri Net and detects inconsistencies solving linear equation systems. Finally, (Bareiss, Porter, & Murray 1989) present an approach to limit the part of the knowledge base on which the presence of a rule can have consequences. All these verifiers assume propositional rule bases (except CHECK), boolean truth values, no control (exhaustive firing) and monotonic inference.
3 The RBES Model

In this paper, the assumed RBES model is (i) based on rules, underlying propositional logic, (ii) with UMS, (iii) with implicit and explicit control, and (iv) monotonic. In the following a detailed description of this model is given.

A rule base RB is denoted by a 5-tuple $<F, R, M, MR, IC>$ where $F$ is a set of facts, $R$ is a set of rules, $M$ is a set of modules, $MR$ is a set of metarules and $IC$ is a set of integrity constraints. A fact $f \in F$ represents an attribute in the problem domain and has both a value and a certainty value ($cv$) associated. Facts are divided in deducible and external depending on whether their values and cvs can be deduced by the RBES or they must be provided as input. The sets of external and deducible facts are noted by $EF$ and $DF$. Some special facts are called goals and are used to drive the deduction process. A rule $r \in R$ is formed by a conjunction of conditions on facts in its left-hand side ($lhs$), and an assertion about the value of one fact in its right-hand side ($rhs$). A $cv$ is attached to $r$. When $r$ is fired, the concluding fact is asserted with a $cv$ computed from the $cvs$ of $lhs(r)$ and $r$. Rules are fired backwards. Each rule belongs to one module. A module $m \in M$ contains a collection of rules and one or several goals. Rules can use facts deduced in modules different from their own module. A metarule $mr \in MR$ is formed by a conjunction of conditions on facts in $lhs(mr)$, and an action in $rhs(mr)$. Two different types of actions are allowed: on modules and on the whole RBES. Depending on these actions, $MR$ is divided in two sets: $MRM$ and $MRS$. Metarules acting on modules have a $cv$ associated, as a measure of the metarule strength. Metarules are fired forward as soon as their conditions are fulfilled. An integrity constraint $ice IC$ is an expression involving cvs of one or several facts, which should be satisfied by every deduction in order to avoid inconsistencies. Integrity constraints are not tested in real time. A set of facts is consistent if no integrity constraint is violated in it.

Concerning the UMS, only one $cv$ is assigned to each fact. A $cv$ represents always positive evidence. A fact $(f)$ and its opposite $(-f)$ are represented separately and each has its own $cv$ (that should obey some constraints). Rules are also labeled with a $cv$. To perform logical operations with cvs the UMS provides two functions: $cv$-conjunction and $cv$-modus-ponens. The function $cv$-conjunction computes the $cv$ of a conjunction of facts from the $cv$ of each fact. It is used to obtain the $cv$ of the whole $lhs(x), x \in R \cup MR$, when $x$ is going to be fired. The function $cv$-modus-ponens computes the $cv$ associated to the consequent of a logical implication from the $cvs$ corresponding to the antecedent and the implication. It is used to obtain the $cv$ of the $rhs(x), x \in R \cup MR$, when $x$ is fired. The certainty threshold $\tau$ cuts all deductions with a $cv$ less than $\tau$.

Control is divided in implicit and explicit. Implicit control is coded as the conflict-set resolution criteria. Only one of these criteria has been considered: select the the most specific rule of the conflict set. Given $r, r' \in R$, $r$ is more specific than $r'$ if $rhs(r) = rhs(r')$ and $lhs(r) > lhs(r')$. This criterion induces a mutual exclusion relation between those rules on which a relationship of specificity holds. Let $r, r' \in R$, such that $r$ is most specific than $r'$. If $r$ has been fired, there is no point in firing $r'$ because all the information contained in $r'$ has already been used in $r$. So $r'$ should never be fired. Conversely, if $r'$ has been fired, it means that $r$ had been tried but failed. Under the monotonicity assumption $r$ cannot be fired later. Therefore, if $r$ is more specific than $r'$, $r$ and $r'$ are mutually exclusive and cannot occur in the same deduction. Explicit control is coded in metarules acting on modules ($MRM$) or on the whole RBES ($MRS$). The role of $MRS$ is to keep updated the active module list ($ACL$). At each time, the $ACL$ contains the modules more adequate to contribute to the final solution. On modules two actions can be performed, add $m$ or remove $m$, meaning that $m$ will be added or removed to/from the $ACL$. A module can be added several times to the $ACL$, but once it has been removed, it cannot be entered again. On the whole RBES only the stop action can be performed.

The RBES model works as follows: when it starts, a metarule builds up an initial $ACL$. Then the following cycle starts. A module is selected from the $ACL$ as the current module. Their goals are pursued using the rules contained in it. As soon as new facts are deduced, metarules are tested for firing, and the $ACL$ is eventually updated. When every goal in the current module has been tried, a new current module is selected and the cycle restarts. The RBES stops when no more modules are available in the $ACL$, or a metarule stopping the RBES is fired. From the previous description it is clear that control and domain knowledge form a knowledge hierarchy, acting the former on the latter. This knowledge hierarchy is translated into the following RB object hierarchy,

- Level 4: metarules acting on the RBES
- Level 3: metarules acting on modules
- Level 2: modules containing goals and rules
- Level 1: rules acting on facts
- Level 0: facts

4 Verification Issues

Four classic verification issues are considered: inconsistency, redundancy, circularity, and useless $RB$ objects. Following the hierarchy of levels present at the RBES model, each issue is analyzed in a twofold way: intra-level, considering the $RB$ objects contained at each level in isolation, and inter-level, considering the $RB$ objects contained in a level together with all the objects belonging to upper levels.

Inconsistency. A rule base $RB$ is inconsistent if conflicting situations among $RB$ objects can be achieved from a valid input. An input is valid when it represents some situation that happens in the real world. Assuming that the integrity constraints contained in $IC$ are a good
model of the real world, an input is considered valid if it is consistent. Conflicting situations are:

Intra-level
I-1) At level 3: if after an action remove m, an action add m is performed, on the same module m.
I-2) At level 0: if two or more facts violating an integrity constraint are deduced together from a valid input.

Inter-level
I-3) Between levels 3 and 1: if the firing of a metarule adding the module m prevents a rule in m to be fired.
I-4) Between levels 3 and 1: if the firing of a metarule removing the module m would hypothetically cause a rule in m to be fired.

Redundancy. A rule base RB is redundant if it contains repeated or duplicated knowledge. Redundancy can either have no effect on the RBES functionality (just affecting the computational efficiency) or influence some deductions especially when they are weighted with cvs. Redundancy between RB objects can occur in:

Intra-level
R-1) At level 4, 3 or 1: let x,x'∈MR∪R. Then, x' is redundant with x if (i) rhs(x)=rhs(x'), and (ii) whenever x' is fireable, x is also fireable with identical results.
R-2) At level 0: let f,f'∈DF, f' is redundant with f if whenever f is deduced, f is also deduced with the same cv.
R-3) Between levels 3 and 1: let m∈M, m'∈MRM, and rc R, such that rc m and rhs(m')=add m. r is redundant with mr if whenever mr is fireable, r is also fireable.

Circularity. A rule base RB is circular if it contains a cycle. A cycle exists if an object depends on itself. Different kind of cycles can exist, as a function of the dependencies among RB objects. In the RBES model, two kind of dependencies exist: (i) the dependency of rules and metarules on their respective left-hand sides, and (ii) the implicit dependency of rules on those metarules adding the modules to which these rules belong. The first dependency is denoted by r⇝mr (reads “r depends on mr”), where r and f are connected by a sequence of zero or more rules. Second dependency is denoted by r⇝mr (reads “r is allowed by mr”). Potential cycles are:

Intra-level
C-1) At level 1: a fact depends on itself by a rule chain, 

\[
\begin{align*}
f & \leftarrow r \\
r & \leftarrow f \\
f & \in DF, r \in R
\end{align*}
\]

Inter-level
C-2) Between levels 3 and 1: a fact f depends on rules contained in different modules, and a metarule adding one of these modules depends on f.

\[
\begin{align*}
f & \leftarrow r \\
r & \leftarrow f' \\
f & \in DF, r, r' \in R, rhs(r)=f, rhs(r')=f' \\
m, m' & \in M, r \in m, r' \in m'
\end{align*}
\]

\[
\begin{align*}
r' & \leftarrow m' \\
r & \in MR, rhs(m')=add m, f \in lhs(m')
\end{align*}
\]

C-3) Between levels 3 and 1: two metarules mr, mr' adding respectively the modules m and m', depend on facts f and f', deduced by rules contained in m' and m.

RB useless objects. A RB object is useless if it will never be used. Useless objects include non-fireable, unreachable and shadowed objects. An object is non-fireable when it is supported by a non-valid input. An object is unreachable when there exists a gap in the dependency graph linking this object with inputs. An object is shadowed if there exist other objects that prevent it to be used. Potential cases for useless objects are:

Intra-level
U-1) At level 4, 3 or 1: a non-fireable metarule or rule.
U-2) At level 0: let f,f'∈DF, f is unreachable if every r is non-fireable.

Inter-level
U-3) Between levels 4 and 3: let mr∈RS, m'∈MR, mr' is shadowed by mr if mr is always fired before m'.
U-4) Between levels 4 and 1: let m∈MR, re R, r is shadowed by m' if mr is always fired before r.
U-5) Between levels 3 and 2: let m∈M, m'∈MRM, rhs(m')=add m, m' is unreachable if every metarule mr is either non-fireable or shadowed.
U-6) Between levels 2 and 1: let m∈M, re R, m is unreachable if m is unreachable.
U-7) Between levels 1 and 0: let f,f'∈DF, f is unreachable if every r is either non-fireable, shadowed or unreachable.

5 Extended Labels and Environments

The concepts of label and environment for a deducible fact were introduced by (deKleer 1986) in the ATMS context. An environment for f, Ei(f), is a minimal conjunction of external facts supporting f. The label for f, L(f), is the minimal disjunctive normal form of external facts supporting f. Clearly, L(f) includes all the Ei(f) as disjunctions. These constructs has been successfully used in (Ginsberg 1988), but they do not contain all the required information to verify RBESs with uncertainty and control features. Some more information is needed about (i) the cv range in which a fact can be deduced and (ii) the control actions required for a fact to be deduced.

An extended environment (e-environment, for short) for a deducible fact f, Ee(f), is a triplet <SSi(f), RCVf(f), RSj(f)>. SSi(f) is a minimal set of external facts supporting f, that is to say, an environment in deKleer or Ginsberg sense. RCVf(f) is the range of cvs in which f can be deduced from SSi(f). RCVf(f) is represented by the interval (LCVe(f), UCVe(f)), where LCVf(f) and UCVe(f) are respectively the lower and upper bounds. RSj(f) is the control actions for e-environment (with f), and it is recorded for control reasons; (a) to identify e-environments that are incompatible with this one because mutual exclusion
between their corresponding rule sequences, and (b) to identify the set of metarules that have been eventually fired to enable the rules contained in the rule sequence. Two rule sequences $RS_i, RS_j$ are mutually exclusive (m-exclusive, for short) if there exist $r \in RS_i$ and $r' \in RS_j$ such that $r$ and $r'$ are m-exclusive. Two rules are m-exclusive if one is more specific than the other (see section 3). The extended label (e-label for short) for a deducible fact $f$, $EL(f)$, is the minimal collection of e-environments for $f$.

The concepts of e-environment and e-label can also be applied to rules and metarules. An e-environment for $x$, $EE_j(x)$, $x \in R \cup MR$, is formed by the same components $<SS_j(x), RCV_j(x), RS_j(x)>$, with the same meanings: $SS_j(x)$ is the set of external facts causing $x$ to be fired, $RCV_j(x)$ is the allowed range for the cv of $rhs(x)$, and $RS_j(x)$ is the rule sequence required for $x$ to be fired. $RCV_j(x)$ is the allowed range for the cv of $rhs(x)$, and $RS_j(x)$ is the rule sequence required for $x$ to be fired. Similarly, the e-label for $x$, $EL(x)$, is the minimal collection of e-environments. E-environments and e-labels for $m, me M$, are defined in terms of e-environments for metarules that introduce $m$ in the ACL. Thus, $EL(m) = \cup EL(mr), mr \in MR$, such that $rhs(mr) = \text{add } m$.

A number of relations can hold between e-labels and e-environments. Let $EE$ be the set of e-environments, $EE_i, EE_j \in EE$. $EE_i$ is compatible with $EE_j$ if (a) $SS_i \cup SS_j$ is consistent, and (b) $RS_i$ is not m-exclusive with $RS_j$. $EE_j$ subsumes $EE_i$ if (a) $SS_i$ is contained in $SS_j$ and (b) $RS_i$ is not m-exclusive with $RS_j$, $EE_i$ includes $EE_j$ if (a) $EE_i$ subsumes $EE_j$ and (b) $RCV_i$ contains $RCV_j$. Let $EL$ be the set of e-labels, $EL, EL' \subseteq EL$. $EL$ is compatible with $EL'$ if there exists $EE_i \in EL, EE_j \in EL'$ such that $EE_i$ is compatible with $EE_j$, $EL$ partially subsumes $EL'$ if there exist $EE_i \in EL, EE_j \in EL'$, such that $EE_i$ subsumes $EE_j$. $EL$ totally subsumes $EL'$ if for all $EE_i \in EL$ there exists a $EE_j \in EL'$ such that $EE_i$ is compatible with $EE_j$. $EL$ is fully compatible with $EL'$ if for all $EE_i \in EL$ there exists a $EE_j \in EL'$ such that $EE_i$ is compatible with $EE_j$. $EL$ totally includes $EL'$ if for all $EE_i \in EL'$ there exists a $EE_j \in EL$, such that $EE_i$ includes $EE_j$.

Operations. To effectively compute e-labels and e-environments for RB objects, the following operations are required: (1) a disjunction $\lor$ between e-labels, (2) a conjunction-1 $\land_1$ between e-labels or between e-environments, (3) a modus-ponens $\otimes$ between rules or metarules and e-labels or e-environments, and (4) a conjunction-2 $\land_2$ between e-labels or between e-environments. These operations allow us to represent all potential steps that the RBES can perform in terms of e-labels and e-environments. They are defined in the following. The same symbol is used to indicate the same operation on e-labels or e-environments.

(1) Disjunction: models the different ways to conclude a fact. It is defined by,

$$v: EL \times EL \rightarrow EL$$

$$EL \lor EL' = \{ EE_i \mid EE_i \in EL \text{ or } EE_i \in EL' \}$$

(2) Conjunction-1: models the computations performed at $lhs(x)$, $x \in R \cup MR$, when $x$ is going to be fired. It is defined by,

$$\land_1: EL \times EL \rightarrow EL$$

$$EL \land_1 EL' = \{ EE_i \land_1 EE_j \mid EE_i \in EL, EE_j \in EL' \}$$

(3) Modus ponens: models the computations performed when $x \in R \cup MR$ is fired, assuming $lhs(x)$ is satisfied. It is defined by,

$$\otimes: R \times EL \rightarrow EL$$

$$x \otimes EL = \{ x@EE_i \mid EE_i \in EL \}$$

(4) Conjunction-2: models the relations that should exist between a rule $r$ belonging to a module $m$ and a metarule $mr$ activating $m$, to allow $r$ to be fired. It is defined by,

$$\land_2: EL \times EL \rightarrow EL$$

$$EL \land_2 EL' = \{ EE_i \land_2 EE_j \mid EE_i \in EL, EE_j \in EL' \}$$

where $LCV_i = cv\text{-conjunction (LCV}_{i}, LCV_{j})$, and $UCV_i = cv\text{-modus-ponens (UCV}_{i}, UCV_{j})$. If $EE_j$ is an e-environment satisfying $lhs(x)$, $x@EE_j$ models the action of firing $x$: (a) if $x \in R$ it should be not m-exclusive with the rule sequence of $lhs(x)$, and (b) if it is fired, the cv of $rhs(x)$ is obtained from the cvs of $lhs(x)$ and $x$ itself, using the function $cv\text{-modus-ponens}$.

$$EL \land_2 EL' = \{ EE_i \land_2 EE_j \mid EE_i \in EL, EE_j \in EL' \}$$

$$\land_1: EL \times EL \rightarrow EL$$

$$EL \land_1 EL' = \{ EE_i \land_1 EE_j \mid EE_i \in EL, EE_j \in EL' \}$$

$$SS_k = SS_i \cup SS_j \text{ if the union is consistent}$$

$$RS_k = RS_i \cup RS_j \text{ if they are not m-exclusive}$$

$$RCV_k = RCV_i \text{ when any of the parts is empty, the resulting environment is empty. Let } x \in R \cup MR, \text{ assuming that } lhs(x) \text{ is the conjunction of the facts } y \text{ and } z, EE_i(y) \land_1 EE_j(z) \models \text{ the computation performed to check if } lhs(x) \text{ is satisfied: (a) if the union of their support sets is consistent, (b) if the cv-conjunction of their cvs is greater than the threshold, and (c) if their rule sequences are not m-exclusive.}$$

$$RCV_k = [LCV_k, UCV_k]$$

$$SS_k = SS_i \cup SS_j \text{ if the union is consistent}$$

$$RS_k = RS_i \cup RS_j \text{ if they are not m-exclusive}$$

$$SS_k = SS_i \cup SS_j \text{ if the union is consistent}$$

$$RS_k = RS_i \cup RS_j \text{ if they are not m-exclusive}$$

$$EE_i(r) \land_2 EE_j(mr) \models \text{ the conditions for } r \text{ to be fired: (a) the union of their support sets should be consistent and (b) their rule sequences should be not m-exclusive.}$$
Computing e-labels. Using the operations defined above, the e-labels for the RB objects can be expressed in the following way,

\begin{align}
fe \in EF & \quad EL(f) = \{ EE0(f) \} \quad (1) \\
fe \in DF & \quad EL(f) = \lor EL(r) \quad (2) \\
\quad r \in R, f = rhs(r) \\
\quad \forall m \in M & \quad EL(m) = \lor EL(mr) \quad (5)
\end{align}

where \( EE0(f) = \{ f \} \), \{ unknown, true, \} , \emptyset \}. The meaning of these expressions is straightforward. In (1) the e-label of an external fact \( f \) is composed by only one e-environment \( EE0(f) \), the terminal environment, trivially built. In (2) the e-label of a deducible fact \( f \) is the disjunction of the e-labels of the rules concluding \( f \). In (3) the e-label of a rule \( r \) is obtained in three steps: (a) conjunction-1 of the e-label of a deducible fact \( f \) with e-label of \( r \), and (c) conjunction-2 with the e-label of \( m \), the module to which \( r \) belongs. The justification of each step is clear:

1. Step (a) requires \( lhs(r) \) to be satisfied, computing the \( cv \) of the whole premise (that should be greater than \( \tau \)), and checking that no m-exclusive rules have been used to deduce facts in \( lhs(r) \), step (b) adds the rule \( r \) in the computation, including its \( cv \) and checking again \( r \) for mutual exclusion with those rules previously used, and step (c) establishes that \( r \) can only be fired when the explicit control has activated the module containing \( r \). In expression (4) the e-label of a metarule is computed like the e-label of rule that is not included in any module. Finally, in (5) the e-label of a module \( m \) is the disjunction of the e-labels of the metarules activating \( m \).

It is possible to discriminate, for each piece of information contained in an e-environment \( EE \), whether it has been generated by the action of domain or control knowledge. According to this \( EE \) can be decomposed in an e-environment restricted to the domain \( EE_d \), and an e-environment restricted to the control \( EE_c \), related by the operator \( \land \), \( EE = EE_d \land EE_c \). These components are adequate to check a number of verification issues, specially those in which a rule is tested against the metarules dealing with its module. Similar expressions to (1)-(5) are deduced for e-labels and e-environments restricted to domain knowledge (Meseguer 1991),

\begin{align}
fe \in EF & \quad EL(f)_d = \{ EE0(f) \} \quad (6) \\
fe \in DF & \quad EL(f)_d = \lor EL(r)_d \quad (7) \\
\quad r \in R, f = rhs(r) \\
\quad \forall m \in M & \quad EL(m)_d = \lor EL(mr)_d \quad (9)
\end{align}

It is not possible to define e-labels restricted to control knowledge, and the most general expression for e-environments restricted to control knowledge is the following,

\begin{align}
EE(x)_c = \land_{i=1}^n EE(m_i), x \in F \cup R \cup MR \cup M \\
\quad r \in RS(x)_d, r \in m_i
\end{align}

To compute all e-labels is enough computing all the e-labels restricted to domain knowledge (Meseguer 1991).

### 6 Verification Procedure

The verification issues can be reformulated in terms of relations between e-labels in the following way:

**Inconsistency**

I-1) Let \( m \in M \), \( mr, mr' \in MRM \), such that \( rhs(mr)=add m \) and \( rhs(mr')=remove m \). There exists inconsistency if \( EL(mr') \) partially subsumes \( EL(mr) \).

I-2) Let \( f, f' \in F \), \( ice IC \). There exists inconsistency if \( EEi(f)_d \neq EEi(f')_d \)

I-3) Let \( m \in M \), \( mr, mr' \in MRM \), \( r \in R \), such that \( rhs(mr)=remove m \) and \( rem \). There exists inconsistency if \( EL(r)_d \) partially subsumes \( EL(mr) \).

**Redundancy**

R-1) Let \( x, x' \in MR \cup R \), such that \( rhs(x)=rhs(x') \). \( x' \) is redundant with \( x \) if \( EL(x) \) totally includes \( EL(x') \).

R-2) Let \( f, f' \in DF \), \( f' \) is redundant with \( f \) if \( EL(f) \) totally includes \( EL(f') \).

R-3) Let \( m \in M \), \( mr, mr' \in MRM \), \( r \in R \), such that \( rem \) and \( rhs(mr)=add m \). \( r \) is redundant with \( mr \) if \( EL(r)_d \) totally subsumes \( EL(mr) \).

**Circularity**

C-1) Let \( r \in R \), \( m \in M \), \( rem \), there is a cycle if there exists \( EEi(r)_d \neq EL(r)_d \), such that \( \forall \in RS(i)_d \).

C-2) Let \( r \in R \), \( m \in M \), \( rem \), \( EEi(r)_d \neq EL(r)_d \). Let \( m_1, ..., m_k \) the modules to which rules in \( RS(i)_d \) belong. There is a cycle if there exists \( EEi(m_j)_d \neq EL(m_j)_d \) such that \( m_j \neq \forall \in RS(m_j)_d, j=1, ..., k \).

C-3) Let \( m \in M \), \( EEi(m)_d \neq EL(m)_d \). Let \( m_1, ..., m_k \) the modules to which rules in \( RS(m)_d \) belong. There is a cycle if there exists \( EEi(m_j)_d \neq EL(m_j)_d \) and \( rem \), such that \( m_j \neq \forall \in RS(m_j)_d, j=1, ..., k \).

**Useless RB objects**

U-1) Let \( x \in R \cup MR \), \( x \) is non-fireable if \( EL(x)=\emptyset \).

U-2) Let \( f \in F \), \( f \) is unreachable if \( EL(f)=\emptyset \).

U-3) Let \( mr \in MRS \), \( mr' \in MRM \), \( mr' \) is shadowed by \( mr \) if \( EL(mr) \) totally subsumes \( EL(mr') \).

U-4) Let \( mr \in MRS \), \( r \in R \), \( r \) is shadowed by \( mr \) if \( EL(mr) \) totally subsumes \( EL(r) \).
U-5) Let \( m \in M, mr \in MRM \), \( rhs(mr) = \text{add } m, m \) is unreachable if every metarule \( mr \) is either non-fireable or shadowed.

U-6) Let \( m \in M, r \in R, r \in m \), \( r \) is unreachable if \( m \) is unreachable.

U-7) Let \( f \in F, r \in R, f \in rhs(r), f \) is unreachable if every \( r \) is either non-fireable, shadowed or unreachable.

So, a verification procedure can be built up with the following steps: (i) compute for every \( RB \) object their e-labels restricted to the domain knowledge, detecting all circularities of type 1 (otherwise the procedure could loop itself), (ii) detect all useless \( RB \) objects, removing them for further processing, (iii) check circularities, cases 2 and 3, (iv) check inconsistency, and (v) check redundancy. This procedure has been implemented in Common Lisp, and their results testing three rule bases developed with the shell MILORD (Sierra 1989) on a SUN-4/260, are contained in the Table 1.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>#M</th>
<th>#R</th>
<th>#MR</th>
<th>#e-environments</th>
<th>memory (kb)</th>
<th>CPU time (min)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>502</td>
<td>192</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>344</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>41,235</td>
<td>7,424</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1. Experimental Results

These results show how the complexity increases with the \( RB \) size, specially when metarules contain in their left-hand sides goals of modules (third rule base). It is worth noticing that, once a rule base has been verified, this procedure can be used to incrementally verify changes on it. To do that, the step (i) in the verification procedure has to be repeated, but steps (ii) to (v) have to be performed on changed \( RB \) objects only. Computing e-labels is not very expensive computationally, it requires 1% of the total CPU time (on average over the three rule bases). The computational complexity of this procedure is in the worst case, exponential. By worst case it is understood that all the possible combinations of values and cvs for facts are present in the rule base. But this is quite far from reality, so it may be reasonable to expect an average case complexity that allows one to effectively check a rule base of several hundreds rules and one hundred metarules.

7 Conclusions

From this work three main conclusions can be extracted. First, it is clear that current RBEs present new verification problems that available verifiers are not able to deal with. These problems can be very serious and require mandatory checking. Second, previous constructs, labels and environments, can be successfully extended including more information to solve these problems. And third, an effective testing of these problems can be performed in a reasonable amount of time and space for medium size rule bases.

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References


