Is Intractability of Non-Monotonic Reasoning a Real Drawback?

Marco Cadoli and Francesco M. Donini and Marco Schaerf
Dipartimento di Informatica e Sistemistica
Università di Roma “La Sapienza”
Via Salaria 113, I-00198 Roma, Italy
cmail: <lastname>Qassi.dis.uniroma1.it

Abstract
Several studies about complexity of NMR showed that inferring in non-monotonic knowledge bases is significantly harder than reasoning in monotonic ones. This contrasts with the general idea that NMR can be used to make knowledge representation and reasoning simpler, not harder. In this paper we show that, to some extent, NMR has fulfilled its goal. In particular we prove that circumscription allows for more compact and natural representation of knowledge. Results about intractability of circumscription can therefore be interpreted as the price one has to pay for having such an extra-compact representation. On the other hand, sometimes NMR really makes reasoning simpler; we give prototypical scenarios where closed-world reasoning accounts for a faster and unsound approximation of classical reasoning.

Introduction
The complexity of non-monotonic reasoning (NMR) has been extensively analyzed in recent years. Several studies showed that inferring in non-monotonic knowledge bases is significantly harder than reasoning in monotonic ones. As an example, while inference in propositional Horn formulae can be done in linear time provided we reason in the classical semantics (Dowling & Gallier 1984), inference under circumscription in such formulae is a co-NP complete problem (Cadoli & Lenzerini 1990).

Although there are cases in which non-monotonic inference has a complexity which is comparable to classical inference, the general picture shows that tractable problems may become intractable (e.g. the complexity raises from polynomial to NP-complete (Kautz & Selman 1991)), intractable problems may become “more” intractable (e.g. from NP-complete to $\Sigma_2^p$-complete (Gottlob 1992)), decidable problems may become undecidable (Baader & Hollunder 1992), and undecidable problems may become “more” undecidable (e.g. from r.e.-complete to $\Pi_2^1$-complete (Schlipf 1987)). An up-to-date survey on computational aspects of NMR appears as (Cadoli & Schaerf 1993).

This aspect of NMR is acknowledged in the AI community. Brachman (1990, p. 1090) writes:

“An irony of work on NMR is that, while the easy adoption and retraction of assumptions is most useful for speeding up natural everyday reasoning, most current NMR proposals drastically compound the already difficult problem of deductive reasoning. We urgently need to determine how NMR can be used to make commonsense inference faster, not slower.”

The general idea about NMR is that it can be seen as a fast but unsound approximation of ordinary reasoning, as it is not possible to make reasoning more efficient while preserving both soundness and completeness.

Apart from AI, NMR is sometimes used to represent knowledge in a more compact fashion. Noticeably, negation through cut is commonly used among PROLOG programmers for writing more compact and efficient programs (Sterling & Shapiro 1986, Chap 11). Moreover, closed-world reasoning allows for effective representation of implicit knowledge in relational as well as deductive databases, and has been widely used among database practitioners for many years now.

Hence, there is a mismatch between the intuition behind NMR and the theoretical results on its computational complexity. The following questions naturally arise:

- is high complexity of NMR a bug or a feature?
- is the intuition that NMR simplifies reasoning wrong?
- are there complexity analyses showing that NMR fits its intuition?

The goal of this paper is to give a preliminary answer to the above questions. In particular we address two topics:

1. It is clear that NMR captures additional - wrt to classical reasoning - information and that such information makes reasoning harder. Now suppose we want to make the same inferences that we do in NMR knowledge bases “without using NMR”, i.e. suppose we have a KB $K$ and we want a new KB $K'$ s. t. $K \vdash_{NMR} Q$ iff $K' \models Q$. How would the monotonic KB $K'$ look like? How large would it be?
2. It is advocated that NMR makes reasoning faster and unsound. Theoretical results seem to contradict it. Can we show specific examples and frameworks which concretely support the above idea?

Discussion on the above topics will be carried out by means of examples taken from the academic domain.

The structure of the paper is the following: In the rest of the Introduction we recall some definitions about NMR; then we devote a section to each of the two topics above. In the last section we draw some conclusions.

**Preliminaries**

Throughout the paper we restrict our attention to propositional knowledge bases. We analyze closed-world reasoning and circumscription, two of the major NMR formalisms. Since they are widely known, in this paper we just mention the main definitions underlying them. Interpretations and models of propositional formulae will be denoted as sets of atoms (those which are mapped into 1).

**Definition 1 (Lifschitz 1985)** Let $M, N$ be two models of a propositional formula $T$ and $(P; Z)$ a partition of the atoms of $T$. We write $M \leq (P, Z) N$ if $M \cap P \subseteq N \cap P$.

A model $M$ is called $(P, Z)$-minimal for a formula $T$ if there is no model $N$ of $T$ such that $N \leq (P, Z) M$ and $M \not\leq (P, Z) N$.

The circumscription $\text{CIRC}(T; P; Z)$ of $T$ minimizes the atoms in $P$ and varying the atoms in $Z$ denotes the set of $(P; Z)$-minimal models of $T$.

Intuitively a propositional atom is placed in $P$ if we don’t like it to be in models. In common-sense reasoning typically such atoms denote abnormality (McCarthy 1986). When an atom is in $Z$ we accept that it occurs in models, provided this helps in excluding some of the atoms in $P$.

When $Z = \emptyset$ the $(P, Z)$-minimal models of a formula are called just minimal. The closed-world assumption $\text{CWA}(T)$ of a propositional formula $T$ is defined as follows in (Reiter 1978):

$$\text{CWA}(T) = T \cup \{ \neg p \mid T \not\models p \}.$$ 

$\text{CWA}(T)$ is consistent iff $T$ has a unique minimal model; in such a case that model is the unique model of $\text{CWA}(T)$.

**NMR for compact representation of knowledge**

This section deals with using NMR for representing information in a compact way, where compactness is measured wrt classical representation of the same knowledge.

We introduce an example dealing with a student who needs to plan his/her curriculum. We show that the natural way the student can do this is to reason using circumscription. Given that the problem is computationally intractable, we address the following question: if the student was to reason in a classical fashion – e.g. using a classical theorem prover like OTTER (Mc-Cune 1990) – how much implicit information would he/she need to represent explicitly in the new KB? In other words, is it feasible to transform the original KB – dealt with NMR – into a new one – dealt with a classical inference engine – such that the same inferences are possible? The results we prove show that this is not feasible, since NMR allows one to save a huge amount of space.

**Example 1: (The lazy student)** The set of admissible **curricula** is represented by means of the models of a propositional formula $T$ which might look like the following:

- DataBases $\lor$ Algebra
- Algebra $\lor$ NonMonotonicReasoning
- DataBases $\lor$ ReasoningAboutKnowledge
- Algebra $\lor$ ReasoningAboutKnowledge
- Algebra $\lor$ ComputationalComplexity

Throughout this section we assume that such formulae are always in 2-CNF, i.e. they have at most two literals per clause. A **curriculum** is just a model of $T$, e.g. $\{\text{DataBases, Algebra, NonMonotonicReasoning}\}$. Such a definition does not capture the preferences that a student might have. As an example the student might be better off by doing both courses $\{\text{ReasoningAboutKnowledge, ComputationalComplexity}\}$ than doing just one of the courses $\{\text{DataBases, Algebra, NonMonotonicReasoning}\}$. This suggests to use the idea of $(P, Z)$-minimal models – where all exams that the student dislikes are in $P$; let’s say that $P = \{\text{DataBases, Algebra, NonMonotonicReasoning}\}$ and $Z = \{\text{ReasoningAboutKnowledge, ComputationalComplexity}\}$. A minimal curriculum is a $(P, Z)$-minimal model of $T$. In the above situation there are three minimal curricula: $\{\text{Algebra, ReasoningAboutKnowledge}\}$, $\{\text{Algebra, ReasoningAboutKnowledge, ComputationalComplexity}\}$, $\{\text{DataBases, NonMonotonicReasoning, ReasoningAboutKnowledge, ComputationalComplexity}\}$.

A course $c$ is **mandatory** if it has to be done in all curricula, i.e. $T \models c$. A course $c$ is **preferred** if it has to be done in all minimal curricula, i.e. $\text{CIRC}(T; P; Z) \models c$.

In the above situation there are no mandatory courses, although $\text{ReasoningAboutKnowledge}$ is preferred.

The above example shows that there are at least four possible computational services that a student might ask:

**Problem 1.** Find a curriculum. The student has no specific preferences, a curriculum is just as good as any other one.
Problem 2. Find a minimal curriculum. This is an improvement wrt to the previous service, as the student can express some preferences. Nevertheless, there is no explanation why a curriculum is provided. In Example 1, \{Algebra,ReasoningAboutKnowledge,ComputationalComplexity\} is as good as \{Algebra,ReasoningAboutKnowledge\}. Even if the second one is provided as an answer, the student does not know whether ReasoningAboutKnowledge is preferred or not.

Problem 3. Decide whether a course is mandatory. The student – with no preferences – wants to know whether he/she must attend a specific course. The weakness of this service is in that a non-mandatory course could be true only in curricula that the student would never accept.

Problem 4. Decide whether a course is preferred (preferences decided in advance). Same as above, but the student has preferences.

This sophisticated form of reasoning is mostly relevant in this situation: the lazy student might take course c, but he/she does not want to commit until he/she is completely convinced that c is preferred. In fact not all courses suggested by an answer to Problem 2 are preferred.

The complexity of the above problems has already studied in the literature (when T is in 2-CNF):

- Problem 1. is polynomial (Even, Itai, & Shamir 1976);
- Problem 2. is polynomial (Cadoli 1992);
- Problem 3. is polynomial (Even, Itai, & Shamir 1976);
- Problem 4. is co-NP-complete (Cadoli & Lenzerini 1990).

In the above scenario NMR seems to do exactly the form of reasoning the student needs. In fact a solution to Problem 4 gives some extra information that the student does not accept its extra complexity. Furthermore this extra complexity does not seem to be really dangerous: since the set of courses the student could ever take is limited – let's say they are c1, ..., cn – he/she might compute which of them is preferred, i.e., decide whether \( CIRC(T; P; Z) \models c_i \) holds for each \( i (1 \leq i \leq n) \). Even if this amounts to solve \( n \) co-NP-complete problems – one for each query – it is not necessary to find the answer when the student asks a query. More precisely the queries can be posed off-line and their answers cached; then on-line query-answering just amounts to table look-up, which is clearly polynomial.

We call compilation any off-line process that makes on-line reasoning polynomial.

The next step is now to consider the scenario where several students are interested in preparing their curricula. In this case, students may have the same preferences, or may not.

Problem 4.1. Decide (repeatedly) whether a course is preferred, when all students have the same preferences;

Problem 4.2. Decide (repeatedly) whether a course is preferred, when each student has his/her own preferences.

The above argument proves the following property of Problem 4.1.

Proposition 1 It is possible to compile Problem 4.1. Compilation for Problem 4.1 can be done simply by caching. Even if such caching cannot be done for Problem 4.2 (there are exponentially many different preferences) one may wonder if the problem is compilable in some smarter way.

However, we are able to show that it is very unlikely that such a compilation may exist. To do this we resort on the notion of non-uniform computation. A problem \( \Pi \) is in the class non-uniform P if there exists a function \( f() \) that for each instance \( n \) of \( \Pi \) maps the size of \( n \) into a polynomial-time algorithm that solves \( \pi \) (Johnson 1990, p. 116). We remark that there is no restriction on \( f() \), which may be even non-recursive. Intuitively, \( f() \) represents the off-line computation. The relations between non-uniform P and uniform complexity classes, such as NP, have been studied in the literature. In particular it has been shown (Karp & Lipton 1980) that \( NP \subseteq \text{non-uniform P} \) would imply some unlikely consequences on complexity classes.

Theorem 2 Unless \( NP \subseteq \text{non-uniform P} \), there is no data structure representing a 2-CNF formula \( T \) such that, given a set \( P \) of atoms to minimize and a set \( Z \) of varying atoms, deciding whether \( CIRC(T; P; Z) \models z \) (with \( z \in Z \)) can be answered in polynomial time.

Proof. We first prove a key lemma. Its proof is based on a reduction given in (Cadoli & Lenzerini 1990, Theorem 5), which showed that inference in 2-positive-CNF under CIRC is coNP-hard. The major difference is that we now need to code every possible 3-CNF over \( n \) atoms in one theory.

Lemma 3 For any integer \( n \), there exists a 2-positive-CNF formula \( T_n \) of polynomial size wrt \( n \), such that given any 3-CNF formula \( \pi \) using \( n \) atoms, there are particular \( P_\pi \) and \( Z_\pi \) such that \( \pi \) is unsatisfiable iff \( CIRC(T_n; P_\pi; Z_\pi) \models z \).

Proof (sketch). We use the following conventions. We denote with \( a, b, c, d \) propositional atoms; if \( a \) is an atom, \( \overline{a} \) is its negation. We denote with \( u, x, y \) literals (i.e., either atoms or negated atoms). If \( x \) is the literal \( a \), then \( \overline{x} \) is \( \overline{a} \).

Let \( L \) be the alphabet of \( n \) atoms used in the 3-CNF formulas. Let \( L' \) be the alphabet \( \{a, \overline{a} \mid a \in L\} \), where \( \overline{\overline{x}} = x \), and \( C \) is a set of atoms one-to-one with possible three-literals clauses of \( L \), i.e., \( C = \{c_i \mid c_i \text{ is a three-literals clause of } L \} \). Observe that now \( \overline{a} \) denotes also a structural symbol of \( L' \); we retain this ambiguity to simplify the notation in the reduction.

948 Nonmonotonic Reasoning
We define $T$ on the alphabet $L'$ according to the following rules:

1. for each letter $a$ of $L$, there is a clause $a \lor \bar{a}$ in $T$;
2. for each clause $\gamma_i = w \lor x \lor y$, where $w, x, y$ are literals, there are four clauses in $T$. The first three are $c_i \lor w, c_i \lor x, c_i \lor y$; observe that if $x$ is a negated literal in $\pi$, then $x$ is a (syntactically equal) atom in $T$. The fourth clause is $c_i \lor x$.

Notice that the size of $T$ is $O(n^3)$, and $T$ is a 2-positive-CNF formula.

Let $\pi$ be a 3-CNF formula over $L$, and let $c_1, \ldots, c_h$ be all the atoms of $L'$ corresponding to the clauses in $\pi$. Define $P_\pi = \{c_1, \ldots, c_h\} \cup L \cup \bar{L}$, and $Z_\pi = L' - P_\pi$.

Theorem 4 Unless $NP \subseteq \text{non-uniform P}$, there is no data structure representing a 2-CNF $T$ and two sets $P, Z$ of atoms, such that a clause $F$, deciding whether $\text{CIRC}(T, P; Z) \models F$ can be answered in polynomial time.

The proof can be obtained with techniques similar to those of the previous theorem.

At a first sight, the above two theorems seem to give just a negative result: NMR is not compilable. But the result is in fact twofold: the theorems show that if one wants to represent the circumscription of a 2-CNF KB $K$ with a new KB $K'$, either inference in $K'$ is intractable, or (if inference has to be kept tractable) $K'$ has exponential size w.r.t. $K$. In other words, circumscription allows one to derive an exponential number of new consequences not derivable from $K$ with classical inference: If the number of new consequences were polynomial, they could be simply cached. It might be possible that such consequences could be compacted in one formula of polynomial size; but in this case, Theorems 2 and 4 show that extracting consequences from such a formula would very probably be an intractable task. Hence the positive aspect of Theorems 2 and 4 is that circumscription is an extremely powerful tool for representing problems in a compact way.

We summarize the results in Table 1, where we divide cases between the two services, and between "short" and "long" queries. By "short" we mean clauses of fixed length (e.g. length 1 to ask for preferred exams in the lazy student example), while "long" means clauses of arbitrary length.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>all queries with same preferences</th>
<th>different preferences</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&quot;short&quot; queries</td>
<td>compilable</td>
<td>non-compilable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prop. 1</td>
<td>Theo. 2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;long&quot; queries</td>
<td>non-compilable</td>
<td>non-compilable</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theo. 4</td>
<td>Theo. 2, 4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 1: Are 2-CNF knowledge bases compilable under CIRC?

We remark that "non-compilable" also means that CIRC allows one to represent in a compact way an exponential number of new consequences.

### Unsound and fast inference with NMR

As mentioned in the Introduction, it has been frequently argued that one of the expected features of NMR was that it could account for a form of unsound, but fast, inference. The results on the computational complexity of NMR seem to contradict the possibility of NMR of being faster than classical reasoning. In this section we show that NMR is more efficient in...
some situations than classical reasoning even according to worst-case analysis. We introduce this aspect by means of an example.

**Example 2: (The cautious student)** The faculty members decide the requirements needed to attend a course, which may be represented with a set of dependencies $R$:

- $\text{NonMonotonicReasoning} \rightarrow \text{Algebra}$
- $\text{NonMonotonicReasoning} \rightarrow \text{Logic}$
- $\text{DataBases} \rightarrow \text{Algebra}$
- $\text{ComputerArchitectures} \rightarrow \text{Algebra}$
- $\text{ReasoningAboutKnowledge} \rightarrow \text{Logic}$
- $\text{ComputationalComplexity} \rightarrow \text{Logic}$

Throughout this section we assume that such formulae are always Definite Horn. A set such as $C = \{\text{NonMonotonicReasoning, ComputerArchitectures}\}$ can represent courses the student has attended, or has committed to attend. The models of $C \cup R$ represent all admissible completions of the curriculum.

A conjunct like $g_1 = \text{Algebra} \land \text{ReasoningAboutKnowledge} \land \neg \text{DataBases} \land \neg \text{ComputationalComplexity}$ represents courses the student may be interested in taking (positive literals) or avoiding (negative literals), but he/she has not committed yet. The student may also have alternative plans, such as $g_2 = \text{Logic} \land \text{DataBases} \land \text{ComputationalComplexity} \land \neg \text{ReasoningAboutKnowledge}$, or $g_3 = \text{Algebra} \land \text{ComputerArchitectures} \land \neg \text{ReasoningAboutKnowledge}$.

A plan $g$ may be satisfied by a model of $C \cup R$ or not. The student wants to know if in all models at least one of his/her plans will be satisfied. This could be represented as a goal $G = g_1 \lor g_2 \lor g_3$.

The scenario could be modified if the faculty add new requirements to $R$ or if the student makes further commitments, thus adding atoms to $C$. $\diamond$

Let us formalize the computational services the student may be interested in:

**Problem 5.** Decide whether the set of courses in $C$ plus the courses required by $R$ satisfy the goal $G$. This service provides information on the current situation but it does not give any guarantee on the future. It amounts to decide whether $\text{CWA}(C \cup R) \models G$.

**Problem 6.** Decide whether the goal $G$ will be satisfied no matter which new requirements are imposed (in addition to $R$) by the faculty and which new courses (in addition to $C$) the student decides to attend. This service provides information on the current and the future situation. It amounts to decide whether $C \cup R \models G$.

Coming back to the example, we have that $\text{CWA}(C \cup R) \models G$ while $C \cup R \not\models G$. Therefore, if the faculty do not change the set of requirements and the student does not decide to take additional courses, the goal will be satisfied.

Let's consider an alternative goal of the student: $G' = g_1' \lor g_2' \lor g_3'$, where $g_1' = \text{Algebra} \land \text{Logic} \land \text{ReasoningAboutKnowledge} \land \neg \text{ComputationalComplexity}$, $g_2' = \text{Logic} \land \text{ComputationalComplexity} \land \neg \text{ReasoningAboutKnowledge}$, and $g_3' = \text{Algebra} \land \neg \text{ReasoningAboutKnowledge}$. Both $\text{CWA}(C \cup R) \models G'$ and $C \cup R \not\models G'$ hold. As a consequence, the student is sure that, whatever new requirements and courses are added, the goal $G'$ will always be satisfied.

We consider now the complexities of the above problems.

**Problem 5.** is polynomial: First compute the minimal model $M$ of the Horn formula $R \land C$, then check whether $M \models G$. Both steps can be accomplished in polynomial time.

**Problem 6.** is co-NP-complete: hardness follows from the co-NP-completeness of tautology checking of a DNF formula.

NMR is faster than classical reasoning in this specific case. Therefore NMR can be seen as a fast, complete but unsound approximation of classical reasoning, as $\Sigma \models \gamma$ implies $\text{CWA}(\Sigma) \models \gamma$.

This behavior of NMR is not restricted to this particular situation. Let's take a further example from the logic programming field. Let $P$ be a propositional general logic program — where negation is allowed in the body of the rules — and $\gamma$ be a clause. Deciding whether $\gamma$ is true in all the (classical) models of $P$, i.e. $P \models \gamma$ interpreting not as classical negation, is a co-NP-complete problem. On the other hand, deciding whether $\gamma$ is a consequence of $P$ under the well-founded semantics (van Gelder, Ross, & Schlipf 1991), i.e. $\gamma$ is satisfied by the well-founded model of $P$ ($WF(P) \models \gamma$), is a polynomial time problem.

Even in this case NMR accounts for a fast and complete, although unsound, approximation of classical reasoning, as $P \models \gamma$ implies $WF(P) \models \gamma$.

**Conclusions**

Recent theoretical results on the computational complexity of NMR seem to contradict the main reasons for the development of non-monotonic formalisms, namely that defeasible assumptions should allow for: 1) faster, although unsound, inference and 2) more compact representation of knowledge. We have shown in this paper that, to some extent, NMR has fulfilled its goal.

Regarding the second goal, we have proven that circumscription does indeed allow for more compact representation of knowledge. The results can also be extended to circumscription of general propositional formulae (Cadoli, Donini, & Schaerf 1994). Results about intractability of NMR can therefore be interpreted as the price one has to pay for having extra-compact representation of knowledge. It is therefore unfair to say that NMR is harder than classical reasoning. In fact
the input of a NM inference problem could be exponentially smaller than the input of a classical inference problem. On the other hand the implicit assumption in saying that NMR is harder is that the sizes of the inputs are the same.

Regarding the first goal, we have given prototypical scenarios where closed-world reasoning accounts for a faster and unsound approximation of classical reasoning. Therefore NMR is not always computationally harder, and may even be simpler than classical reasoning.

Due to the lack of space we cannot give a detailed comparison of our work with other recently appeared in the literature on off-line reasoning, e.g. Kautz & Selman (1991) and Moses & Tennenholtz (1993). We briefly compare our work with the second one.

Moses & Tennenholtz analyze the possibility of speeding up the complexity of query answering through a previous off-line analysis of the knowledge base. Their goal can be considered as a special case of compilation: They consider a particular subset of all queries, which they call efficient basis, whose answers enables to answer all queries in polynomial time. Some query languages may not admit an efficient basis. Our results complement theirs, as we consider any possible preprocessing (even a non-recursive one) with the only restriction that the new representation can answer queries in time polynomial in the size of the original knowledge base. For each entry of Table 1 marked "non-compilable", we proved that not only no efficient basis exists but also that no other compilation is possible.

Acknowledgements

This work has been supported by the ESPRIT Basic Research Action N.6810 (COMPULOG 2) and by the Progetto Finalizzato Sistemi Informatici e Calcolo Parallelo of the CNR (Italian Research Council), LdR "Ibridi".

References


