Incorporating Opponent Models into Adversary Search

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Abstract

This work presents a generalized theoretical framework that allows incorporation of opponent models into adversary search. We present the \( M^* \) algorithm, a generalization of minimax that uses an arbitrary opponent model to simulate the opponent's search. The opponent model is a recursive structure consisting of the opponent's evaluation function and its model of the player. We demonstrate experimentally the potential benefit of using an opponent model. Pruning in \( M^* \) is impossible in the general case. We prove a sufficient condition for pruning and present the \( \alpha\beta^* \) algorithm which returns the \( M^* \) value of a tree while searching only necessary branches.

Introduction

The minimax algorithm (Shannon 1950) has served as the basic decision procedure for zero-sum games since the early days of computer science. The basic assumption behind minimax is that the player has no knowledge about the opponent's decision procedure. In the absence of such knowledge, minimax assumes that the opponent selects an alternative which is the worst from the player's point of view.

However, it is quite possible that the player does have some knowledge about its opponent. Such knowledge may be a result of accumulated experience in playing against the opponent, or may be supplied by some external source. How can such knowledge be exploited? In game theory, the question is known as the best response problem - looking for an optimal response to a given opponent model (Gilboa 1988). However, there is almost no theoretical work on using opponent models in adversary search. Korf (1989) outlined a method of utilizing multiple-level models of evaluation functions. Carmel and Markovitch (1993) developed an algorithm for utilizing an opponent model defined by an evaluation function and a depth of search.

Jansen (1990) describes two situations where it is important to consider the opponent's strategy. One is a swindle position, where the player has reason to believe that the opponent will underestimate a good move, and will therefore play a poorer move instead. Another situation is a trap position, where the player expects the opponent to overestimate and therefore play a bad move. Another situation, where an opponent model can be beneficial, is a losing position (Berliner 1977). When all possible moves lead to a loss, an opponent model can be used to select a swindle move.

The goal of this research is to develop a theoretical framework that allows exploitation of an opponent model. We start by defining an opponent model to be a recursive structure consisting of a utility function of the opponent and the player model (held by the opponent). We then describe two algorithms, \( M^* \) and \( M_{\text{I-pass}} \), generalizations of minimax that can use an opponent model. Pruning in \( M^* \) is not possible in the general case. However, we have developed the \( \alpha\beta^* \) algorithm that allows pruning given certain constraints over the relationship between the player's and the model's strategies.

The \( M^* \) algorithm

Let \( S \) be the set of possible game states. Let \( \sigma : S \rightarrow 2^S \) be the successor function. Let \( \varphi : S \rightarrow \mathbb{R} \) be an opponent model that specifies the opponent's selected move for each state. The \( M \) algorithm takes a position \( s \in S \), a depth limit \( d \), a static evaluation function \( f : S \rightarrow \mathbb{R} \), an arbitrary opponent model \( \varphi \), and returns a value.

\[
M(s, d, f, \varphi) = \begin{cases} 
  f(s) & d = 0 \\
  \max_{s' \in \sigma(s)} (f(s')) & d = 1 \\
  \max_{s' \in \sigma(s)} (M(\varphi(s'), d-2, f, \varphi)) & d > 1 
\end{cases}
\]

The algorithm selects a move in the following way. It generates the successors of the current position. It then applies \( \varphi \) on each of the successors to obtain the opponent's response and evaluates each of the resulting states by applying the algorithm recursively (with reduced depth limit). It then selects the successor with the highest value. The algorithm returns the static evaluation of the input position when the depth limit is zero.

Note that \( M \) returns a value. \( M \) can also be defined to return the state with the maximal value instead of
the value itself. To simplify the discussion, from now on we will assume that \( M \) returns either the state or the value according to the context.

Let \( M^0_{(f_0),d} \) be the regular minimax algorithm that searches to depth \( d \) using an evaluation function \( f_0 \). Minimax uses itself with \( d - 1 \) and \( -f_0 \) as an opponent model, therefore it can be defined as a special case of \( M \):

\[
M^0_{(f_0),d}(s) = M(s, d, f_0, M^0_{(\neg f_0, d-1)})
\]

Assume that the player uses an evaluation function \( f_1 \). A natural candidate to serve as the model \( \varphi \) in the \( M \) algorithm is \( M^0 \) with another evaluation function \( f_0 \). We call this special case of \( M \) the \( M^1 \) algorithm:

\[
M^1_{(f_1, f_0),d}(s) = M(s, d, f_1, M^0_{(f_0),d-1})
\]

The \( M^2 \) algorithm works by simulating the opponent’s minimax search (to depth \( d - 1 \)) to find its selected move and evaluates the selected move by calling itself recursively (to depth \( d - 2 \)).

**Figure 1**: The search trees spanned by calling \( M^1 \). Part (a) shows the two calls to minimax for determining the opponent’s choice. Part (b) shows the recursive calls to \( M^1 \) for evaluating the nodes selected by the opponent.

Figure 1 shows an example of a search to depth 3 performed by the \( M^1 \) algorithm. Part (a) shows the two calls to minimax to simulate the opponent’s search. Note that the opponent is a maximizer. Part (b) of the figure shows the two recursive calls to \( M^1 \) applied to the boards selected by the opponent. Note that while the opponent’s minimax procedure believes that in node \( e \) the player selects the move leading to node \( k \), the player actually prefers node \( j \).

We can define the \( M^n \) algorithm, for any \( n \), to be the \( M \) algorithm with \( \varphi = M^{n-1} \). \( M^n \) can be formally defined as follows:

\[
M^n_{(f_1, \ldots, f_0),d}(s) = M(s, f_n, d, M^{n-1}_{(f_1, \ldots, f_0),d-1})
\]

Thus, a player using the \( M^1 \) algorithm assumes that its opponent uses \( M^0 \) (minimax), a player using the \( M^2 \) algorithm assumes that its opponent uses \( M^1 \), etc. We will define the \( M^* \) algorithm that includes every \( M^n \) algorithm as a special case. \( M^* \) receives as a parameter a player which includes information about both the player’s evaluation function and its model of the opponent.

**Definition 1**: A player is a pair defined as follows:
1. Given an evaluation function \( f \), \( P = (f, \text{NIL}) \) is a player (with a modeling-level \( 0 \)).
2. Given an evaluation function \( f \) and a player \( O \) (with modeling level \( n - 1 \)), \( P = (f, O) \) is a player (with a modeling level \( n \)).

The first element of a player is called the player’s strategy and the second element is called the opponent model.

Thus, a zero-level modeling player, \( (f_0, \text{NIL}) \), is one that does not model its opponent. A one-level modeling player, \( (f_1, (f_0, \text{NIL})) \), is one that has a model of its opponent, but assumes that its opponent is a zero-level modeling player. A two-level modeling player, \( (f_2, (f_1, (f_0, \text{NIL}))) \), is one that uses a strategy \( f_2 \), and has a model of its opponent, \( (f_1, (f_0, \text{NIL})) \). The opponent’s model uses a strategy \( f_1 \) and has a model, \( (f_0, \text{NIL}) \), of the player. The recursive definition of a player is in the spirit of the Recursive Modeling Method by Gmytrasiewicz, Durfee and Wehe (1991).

\( M^* \) receives a position, a depth limit, and a player, and outputs a move selected by the player and its value. The algorithm generates the successor boards and simulates the opponent’s search from each of them in order to anticipate its choice. This simulation is achieved by applying the algorithm recursively with the opponent model as the player. The player then evaluates each of its optional moves by evaluating the outcome of its opponent’s reaction by applying the algorithm recursively using its own strategy.

**Figure 2**: The set of recursive calls generated by calling \( M^*(a, 3, (f_2, (f_1, f_0))) \). Each call is written next to the node it is called from. The dashed lines show which move is selected by each call.

Figure 2 shows an example of a search tree spanning nodes \( b \) and \( c \). The opponent simulates the player by using its own model of the player from nodes \( d \) and \( e \). At node \( d \) the model of the player used by the opponent \( (f_0) \) selects node \( h \). The opponent then applies its
function to node \( h \) and concludes that node \( h \), and therefore node \( d \), are worth \(-6\). The opponent then applies the player’s model \( (f_0) \) to node \( e \), concludes that the player select node \( j \), applies its own function \( (f_1) \) to node \( j \), and decides that node \( j \), and therefore node \( e \), are worth \(-8\). Therefore, the opponent model, when applied to node \( b \), selects the move that leads to node \( d \). The player then evaluates node \( d \) using its own criterion \( (f_2) \). It applies \( M^* \) to node \( d \) and concludes that node \( d \), and therefore node \( b \), are worth \(8\). Simulation of the opponent from node \( c \) yields the selection of node \( g \). The player then evaluates \( g \) according to its own strategy and finds that it is worth \(10\) (the value of node \( n \)). Note that when the opponent simulates the player from node \( g \), it wrongly assumes that the player will select the child with maximal \( V_{n-2} \) value. Therefore, the value of the current node for the opponent is the \( V_{n-1} \) value of the selected child with the maximal \( V_{n-2} \) value. At an opponent’s node, we do the same but the roles of the opponent and the player are switched.

### Procedure \( M^* (pos, d, (f_{pl}, O)) \)

- If \( d = 0 \) then return \((NIL, f_{pl}(pos))\)
- else
  - \(\text{max} \_\text{value} \rightarrow -\infty\)
  - \(S \rightarrow \sigma(pos)\)
  - for each \( s \in S \)
    - if \( d = 1 \) then \( pl_v \rightarrow f_{pl}(s)\)
    - else
      - \((op_b, op_v) \rightarrow M^*(s, d - 1, O)\)
      - \((pl_b, pl_v) \rightarrow M^*(op_b, d - 2, (f_{pl}, O))\)
  - if \( pl_v > \text{max} \_\text{value} \)
    - \(\text{max} \_\text{value} \rightarrow pl_v\)
  - \(\text{max} \_\text{board} \rightarrow s\)
- return \((\text{max} \_\text{board}, \text{max} \_\text{value})\)

#### Figure 3: The \( M^* \) algorithm

The \( M^n \) algorithm calls \( M^0 \) when \( n \) reaches \(0\). However, note that \( M^* \) does not contain such a call. This will work correctly when the modeling level is larger than the search depth. If the modeling level of the original player \( n \) is smaller than the depth of the search tree \( d \), we replace the 0-level modeling player \( f_0 \) by \( d-n \)

\[(f_0, (-f_0, (f_0, . . .))\)]

#### A one-pass version of \( M^* \)

It is obvious that the \( M^* \) algorithm performs multiple expansions of parts of the search tree. We have developed another version of the \( M^* \) algorithm, called \( M^*_{1-pass} \), that expands the tree one time only, just as minimax does. The algorithm expands the search tree in the same manner as minimax. However, node values are propagated differently. Whereas minimax propagates only one value, \( M^* \) propagates \( n+1 \) values, \((V_n, . . ., V_0)\). The value \( V_i \) represents the merit of the current node according to the i-level model, \( f_i \). \( M^*_{1-pass} \) passes values associated with the opponent in a different manner. In a player’s node (a node where it is the player’s turn to play)\(^1\), for values associated with the player \((V_n, V_{n-2}, . . .)\), \( V_i \) receives the maximal \( V_i \) value among its children. For values associated with the opponent \((V_{n-2}, V_{n-3}, . . .)\), \( V_i \) receives the \( V_i \) value of the child that gave the maximal value to \( V_{n-2} \). For example, the opponent believes (according to the model) that the player evaluates nodes by \( V_{n-2} \). At a player’s node, the opponent assumes that the player will select the child with maximal \( V_{n-2} \) value. Therefore, the value of the current node for the opponent is the \( V_{n-1} \) value of the selected child with the maximal \( V_{n-2} \) value. At an opponent’s node, we do the same but the roles of the opponent and the player are switched.

#### Figure 4: The value vectors propagated by \( M^*_{1-pass} \). This is the same tree as the one shown in Figure 2.

Figure 4 shows an example for a tree spanned by \( M^*_{1-pass} \). This is the same tree as the one shown in Figure 2. Let us look at node \( e \) to understand the way in which the algorithm works. Three players evaluate node \( e \): the player, the opponent model, and the opponent’s model of the player. The opponent’s model of the player evaluates all the successors using evaluation function \( f_0 \) and selects board \( j \) with a value of \(10\). The opponent model knows that it has no effect on the decision taken at node \( e \), since it is the player’s turn to move. It therefore assigns node \( e \) the value of \( j \), selected by the player model, using its own evaluation function \( f_1 \), \((f_1(j) = -8)\). The player actually prefers node \( k \) with the higher \( f_2 \) value \((f_2(k) = 7)\). Thus, the vector propagated from node \( e \) is \((7, -8, 10)\). Note that the values in the vectors correspond to the results of the recursive calls in figure 2. Figure 5 lists the \( M^*_{1-pass} \) algorithm.

#### Properties of \( M^* \)

The following theorem shows that \( M^* \) and \( M^*_{1-pass} \) return the same value.

**Theorem 1** Assume that \( P \) is a n-level modeling player. Let \((v, b) = M^*(pos, d, P)\), and let \(\langle V[n]\rangle = M^*_{1-pass}(pos, d, P)\). Then \(v = V[n]\).

\(^1\)Traditionally such a node is called a MAX node. However, we assume that both players are maximizers.
The number of calls to the expansion function by $M^*$ is bounded by $(b + 1)^{d-1}$. The number of calls by $M^*_{\text{pass}}$ is $\frac{b^n - 1}{b - 1}$.

2. The number of calls to evaluation functions by $M^*$ is bounded by $(b + 1)^d$. The number of calls by $M^*_{\text{pass}}$ is $db^d$.

The theorem implies that $M^*$ and $M^*_{\text{pass}}$ each has an advantage. If it is more important to reduce the number of node expansions than the number of evaluation function calls then one should use $M^*_{\text{pass}}$. Otherwise, $M^*$ should be used. For example, for $d = 10$ and $b = 30$ and a one level modeling player, $M^*$ expands 1.3 times more nodes than $M^*_{\text{pass}}$ but $M^*_{\text{pass}}$ performs 1.5 times more calls to evaluation functions. Note that when the set of evaluation functions consist of the same features (perhaps with different weights), the overhead of multiple evaluation is reduced significantly.

We have already shown that $M^*$ is a generalization of minimax. An interesting property of $M^*$ is that it always selects a move with a value greater or equal to the value of the move selected by minimax that searches the same tree with the same strategy.

**Theorem 3** Assume that $M^*$ and Minimax use the same evaluation function $f$. Then $\text{Minimax}(\text{pos}, d, f) \leq M^*(\text{pos}, d, (f, O))$ for any opponent model $O$.

The theorem states that if you have a good reason to believe that your opponent’s model is different than yours, you could only benefit by using $M^*$ instead of minimax. The reader should note that the above theorem does not mean that $M^*$ selects a move that is better according to some objective criterion, but rather a subjectively better move (from the player’s point of view, according to its strategy). If the player does not have a reliable model of its opponent, then playing minimax is a good cautious strategy.

### Adding pruning to $M^*$

One of the most significant extensions of the minimax algorithm is the $\alpha \beta$ pruning technique. Is it possible to add such an extension to $M^*$ as well? Unfortunately, if we assume a total independence between $f_1$ and $f_0$, it is easy to show that such a procedure cannot exist. Knowing a lower bound for the opponent’s evaluation of a node does not have any implications on the value of the node for the player. A similar situation arises in $\text{MAXN}$, a multi-player game tree search algorithm. Luckhardt and Irani (1986) conclude that pruning is impossible in $\text{MAXN}$ without further restrictions about the players’ evaluation functions. Korf (1991) showed that a shallow pruning for $\text{MAXN}$ is possible if we assume an upper bound on the sum of the players’ functions, and a lower bound on every player’s function.

The basic assumption used for the original $\alpha \beta$ algorithm is that $f_1 + f_0 = 0$ (the zero-sum assumption). This assumption is used to infer a bound on a value of a node for a player based directly on the opponent’s value. A natural relaxation to this assumption is $|f_1 + f_0| \leq B$. This assumption means that while $f_1$ and $-f_0$ may evaluate a board differently, this difference is bounded. For example, the player may prefer a rook over a knight while the opponent prefers the opposite. In such a case, although the player’s value is not a direct opposite of the opponent’s value, we can infer a bound on the player’s value based on the opponent’s value and $B$.

The above assumption can be used in the context of the $M^*_{\text{pass}}$ algorithm to determine a bound on $V_i + V_{i-1}$ at the leaves level. But in order to be able to prune using this assumption, we first need to determine how these bounds are propagated up the search tree.

**Lemma 1** Assume that $A$ is a node in the tree spanned by $M^*_{\text{pass}}$. Assume that $S_1, \ldots, S_k$ are its successors. If there exist non-negative bounds $B_0, \ldots, B_n$, such that for each successor $S_i$, and for each model $i$, $|V_{S_i}[i] + V_{S_i}[i - 1]| \leq B_i$. Then, for each model $1 \leq i \leq n$, $|V_A[i] + V_A[i - 1]| \leq B_i + 2 \cdot B_{i-1}$.

Based on lemma 1, we have developed an algorithm, $\alpha \beta^*$, that can perform a shallow and deep pruning assuming bounds on the absolute sum of functions of the player and its opponent model. $\alpha \beta^*$ takes as input a position, a depth limit, and for each model $i$, a strategy $f_i$, an upper bound $B_i$ on $|f_i + f_{i-1}|$, and a
cutoff value $\alpha_i$. It returns the $M^*$ value of the root by searching only those nodes that might affect this value.

The algorithm works similarly to the original $\alpha \beta$ algorithm, but is much more restricted as to which subtrees can be pruned. The $\alpha \beta^*$ algorithm only prunes branches that all models agree to prune. In regular $\alpha \beta$, the player can use the opponent’s value of a node to determine whether it has a chance to attain a value that is better than the current cutoff value. This is based on the opponent’s value being exactly the same as the player’s value (except for the sign). In $\alpha \beta^*$, the player’s function and the opponent’s function are not identical, but their difference is bounded. The bound on $V_i + V_{i-1}$ depends on the distance from the leaves level. At the leaves level, it can be directly computed using the input $B_i$. At distance $d$, the bound can be computed from the bounds for level $d-1$ as stated by lemma \(^2\).

A cutoff value $\alpha_i$ for a node $v$ is the highest current value of all the ancestors of $v$ from the point of view of player $i$. $\alpha_i$ is modified at nodes where it is player $i$'s turn to play, and is used for pruning where it is player $i-1$'s turn to play. At each node, for each $i$ associated with the player whose turn it is to play, $\alpha_i$ is maximized any time $V_i$ is modified. For each $i$ such that $i - 1$ is associated with the current player, the algorithm checks whether the $i$ player wants its model (the $i-1$ player) to continue its search.

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\(\alpha \beta^*\) computes the bound $B$ for each node. However, a table of the $B$ values can be computed once at the beginning of the search, since they depend only on the $B_i$ and the depth.

\(^2\)The $\alpha \beta^*$ algorithm is listed in figure 7. The following theorem proves that $\alpha \beta^*$ always returns the $M^*$ value of the root.

**Theorem 4** Let $V = \alpha \beta^*(pos, d, (\{f_i\}_{i=0}^{\infty}))(\{\alpha_i\}_{i=0}^{\infty}))$. Let $V' = M^*_1(pos, d, P')$ where $P'$ is $P$ without the bounds. Assume that for any leaf $l$ of the game tree

\[
V' = \max(V'_n, \ldots, V'_d)
\]

\[
V = \max(V'_n, \ldots, V'_d)
\]

Then, $V = V'$.

As the player function becomes more similar to its opponent model (but with an opposite sign), the amount of pruning increases up to the point where they use the same function where $\alpha \beta^*$ prunes as much as $\alpha \beta$.

### Experimental study: The potential benefit of $M^*$

We have performed a set of experiments to test the potential merit of the $M^*$ algorithm. The experiments involve three players: MSTAR, MM and OP. MSTAR is a one-level modeling player. MM and OP are regular minimax players (using $\alpha \beta$ pruning). The experiments were conducted using the domain of checkers. Each tournament consisted of 800 games. A limit of 100 moves per game was set during the tournament.

In the first experiment all players searched to depth 4. MM and $M^*$ used one function while OP used another with equivalent power. MSTAR knows its opponent’s function while MM implicitly assumes that its opponent uses the opposite of its own function. Both MSTAR and MM, limited by their own search depth, wrongly assume that OP searches to depth 3. The following table shows the results obtained.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Wins</th>
<th>Draws</th>
<th>Losses</th>
<th>Points</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MM vs. OP</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>616</td>
<td>90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSTAR vs. OP</td>
<td>126</td>
<td>618</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The first row of the table shows that indeed the two evaluation functions are of equivalent power. The sec-
ond row shows that MSTAR indeed benefited using the extra knowledge about the opponent.

In the second experiment all players searched to depth 4. The three players used the same evaluation function \( f(b, pl) = Mat(b, pl) - \frac{1}{25} \cdot Tot(b) \) where \( Mat(b, pl) \) returns the material advantage of player \( pl \) and \( Tot(b) \) is the total number of pieces. However, while \( M^* \) knows its opponent’s function, MM implicitly assumes that its opponent, \( o \), uses the function \( f(b, o) = -f(b, pl) = -Mat(b, pl) + \frac{1}{25} \cdot Tot(b) \). Therefore, while \( OP \) prefers exchange positions, MM assumes that it prefers to avoid them. The following table shows the results obtained.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Wins</th>
<th>Draws</th>
<th>Losses</th>
<th>Points</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MM vs. OP</td>
<td>171</td>
<td>461</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>803</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MSTAR vs. OP</td>
<td>290</td>
<td>351</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>931</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This result is rather surprising. Despite the fact that all players used the same evaluation function, and searched to the same depth, the modeling program achieved a significantly higher score.

We repeated the last experiment replacing the \( M^* \) algorithm with \( \alpha \beta^* \) and measured the amount of pruning. The bound used for pruning is \( |f_1 + f_0| = |Mat(b, pl) - \frac{1}{25} \cdot Tot(b) + Mat(b, o) - \frac{1}{25} \cdot Tot(b)| \leq \frac{2}{25} \cdot Tot(b) \). While the average number of leaves-per-move for a search to depth 4 by \( M^* \) was 723, \( \alpha \beta^* \) managed to achieve an average of 190 leaves-per-move. \( \alpha \beta \) achieved an average of 66 leaves-per-move.

The last results raise an interesting question. Assume that we allocate a modeling player and an unmodeling opponent the same search resources. Is the benefit achieved by modeling enough to overcome the extra depth that the non-modeling player can search due to the better pruning? We have tested the question in the context of the above experiment. We wrote an iterative deepening versions of both \( \alpha \beta \) and \( \alpha \beta^* \) and let the two play against each other with the same limit on the number of leaves.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Wins</th>
<th>Draws</th>
<th>Losses</th>
<th>Points</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>( \alpha \beta^* ) vs. OP</td>
<td>226</td>
<td>328</td>
<td>246</td>
<td>780</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This result is rather disappointing. The benefit of modeling was outweighed by the cost of the reduced pruning. In general this is an example of the known tradeoff between knowledge and search. The question of when it is worthwhile to use the modeling approach remains open and depends mostly on the particular nature of the search tree and evaluation functions.

**Conclusions**

This paper describes a generalized version of the minimax algorithm that can utilize different opponent models. The \( M^* \) algorithm simulates the opponent’s search to determine its expected decision for the next move, and evaluates the result state by searching its associated subtree using its own strategy.

Experiments performed in the domain of checkers demonstrated the advantage of \( M^* \) over minimax. Can the benefit of modeling outweigh the cost of reduced pruning? We don’t have a conclusive answer for that question. We expect the answer to be dependent on the particular domain and particular evaluation functions used.

There are still many remaining open questions. How does an error in the model effect performance? How can a player use an uncertain model? How can a player acquire a model of its opponent? We tackled these questions but could not include the results here due to lack of space (a full version of the paper that includes these parts is available as (Carmel & Markovitch 1996).)

In the introduction we raised the question of utilizing knowledge about the opponent’s decision procedure in adversary search. We believe that this work presents a significant progress in our understanding of opponent modeling, and can serve as a basis for further theoretical and experimental work in this area.

**References**


