AAAI Publications, Twenty-Fourth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence

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Reasoning about Imperfect Information Games in the Epistemic Situation Calculus
Vaishak Belle, Gerhard Lakemeyer

Last modified: 2010-07-03

Abstract


Approaches to reasoning about knowledge in imperfect information games typically involve an exhaustive description of the game, the dynamics characterized by a tree and the incompleteness in knowledge by information sets. Such specifications depend on a modeler's intuition, are tedious to draft and vague on where the knowledge comes from. Also, formalisms proposed so far are essentially propositional, which, at the very least, makes them cumbersome to use in realistic scenarios. In this paper, we propose to model imperfect information games in a new multi-agent epistemic variant of the situation calculus. By using the concept of only-knowing, the beliefs and non-beliefs of players after any sequence of actions, sensing or otherwise, can be characterized as entailments in this logic. We show how de re vs. de dicto belief distinctions come about in the framework. We also obtain a regression theorem for multi-agent beliefs, which reduces reasoning about beliefs after actions to reasoning about beliefs in the initial situation.

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