AAAI Publications, Twenty-Seventh AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence

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Cost-Optimal Planning by Self-Interested Agents
Raz Nissim, Ronen I. Brafman

Last modified: 2013-06-30

Abstract


As our world becomes better connected and autonomous agents no longer appear to be science fiction, a natural need arises for enabling groups of selfish agents to cooperate in generating plans for diverse tasks that none of them can perform alone in a cost-effective manner. While most work on planning for/by selfish agents revolves around finding stable solutions (e.g., Nash Equilibrium), this work combines techniques from mechanism design with a recently introduced method for distributed planning, in order to find cost optimal (and, thus, social welfare maximizing) solutions. Based on the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanisms, we present both a centralized, and a privacy-preserving distributed mechanism.

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