AAAI Publications, Twenty-First International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence

Font Size: 
A Characterisation of Strategy-Proofness for Grounded Argumentation Semantics
Iyad Rahwan, Kate Larson, Fernando Tohmé

Last modified: 2009-06-24


Recently, Argumentation Mechanism Design (ArgMD) was introduced as a new paradigm for studying argumentation among self-interested agents using game-theoretic techniques. Preliminary results showed a condition under which a direct mechanism based on Dung's grounded semantics is strategy-proof (i.e. truth enforcing). But these early results dealt with a highly restricted form of agent preferences, and assumed agents can only hide, but not lie about, arguments. In this paper, we characterise strategy-proofness under grounded semantics for a more realistic preference class (namely, focal arguments). We also provide the first analysis of the case where agents can lie.


Argumentation; Game Theory; Mechanism Design; Multi-Agent Systems

Full Text: PDF