AAAI Publications, Twenty-Second International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence

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Mechanism Design for Double Auctions with Temporal Constraints
Dengji Zhao, Dongmo Zhang, Laurent Perrussel

Last modified: 2011-06-28


This paper examines an extended double auction model where market clearing is restricted by temporal constraints. It is found that the allocation problem in this model can be effectively transformed into a weighted bipartite matching in graph theory. By using the augmentation technique, we propose a Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism in this model and demonstrate the advantages of the payment compared with the classical VCG payment (the Clarke pivot payment). We also show that the algorithms for both allocation and payment calculation run in polynomial time. It is expected that the method and results provided in this paper can be applied to the design and analysis of dynamic double auctions and futures markets.

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