AAAI Publications, Workshops at the Twenty-Seventh AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence

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Algorithm Selection in Bilateral Negotiation
Litan Ilany, Yakov Gal

Last modified: 2013-06-29

Abstract


Despite the abundance of strategies in the literature on repeated negotiation under incomplete information, there is no single negotiation strategy that is optimal for all possible set- tings. Thus, agent designers face an “algorithm selection” problem— which negotiation strategy to choose when facing a new negotiation. Our approach to this problem is to pre- dict the performance of different strategies based on structural features of the domain and to select the negotiation strategy that is predicted to be most successful using a “meta-agent”. This agent was able to outperform all of the finalists to the recent Automated Negotiation Agent Competition (ANAC). Our results have insights for agent-designers, demonstrating that “a little learning goes a long way”, despite the inherent uncertainty associated with negotiation under incomplete in- formation.

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