Stackelberg Actor-Critic: Game-Theoretic Reinforcement Learning Algorithms

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Abstract

The hierarchical interaction between the actor and critic in actor-critic based reinforcement learning algorithms naturally lends itself to a game-theoretic interpretation. We adopt this viewpoint and model the actor and critic interaction as a two-player general-sum game with a leader-follower structure known as a Stackelberg game. Given this abstraction, we propose a meta-framework for Stackelberg actor-critic algorithms where the leader player follows the total derivative of its objective instead of the usual individual gradient. From a theoretical standpoint, we develop a policy gradient theorem for the refined update and provide a local convergence guarantee for the Stackelberg actor-critic algorithms to a local Stackelberg equilibrium. From an empirical standpoint, we demonstrate via simple examples that the learning dynamics we study mitigate cycling and accelerate convergence compared to the usual gradient dynamics given cost structures induced by actor-critic formulations. Finally, experiments on OpenAI gym environments show that Stackelberg actor-critic algorithms always perform at least as well and often significantly outperform the standard actor-critic algorithm counterparts.

1 Introduction

The algorithmic techniques for reinforcement learning can be classified into policy-based, value-based, and actor-critic methods (Sutton and Barto 2018). Policy-based methods directly optimize a parameterized policy to maximize the expected return, while value-based methods estimate the expected return and then infer an optimal policy from the value-function by selecting the maximizing actions. Actor-critic methods bridge policy-based and value-based methods by learning the parameterized policy (actor) and the value-function (critic) together. In particular, actor-critic methods learn a critic that approximates the expected return of the actor while concurrently learning an actor to optimize the expected return based on the critic’s estimation.

In this paper, we adopt a game-theoretic perspective of actor-critic reinforcement learning algorithms. To provide some relevant background from game theory, recall that Stackelberg games are a class of games that describe interactions between a leader and a follower (Başar and Olsder 1998). In a Stackelberg game, the leader is distinguished by the ability to act before the follower. As a result of this structure, the leader optimizes its objective accounting for the anticipated response of the follower, while the follower selects a best response to the leader’s action to optimize its own objective. The interaction between the actor and critic in reinforcement learning has an intrinsic hierarchical structure reminiscent of a Stackelberg game, which motivates our work to contribute a novel game-theoretic modeling framework along with theoretical and empirical results.

Modeling Contributions. We explicitly cast the interaction between the actor and critic as a two-player general-sum Stackelberg game toward solving reinforcement learning problems. Notably, this perspective deviates from the majority of work on actor-critic reinforcement learning algorithms, which implicitly neglect the interaction structure by independently optimizing the actor and critic objectives using individual gradient dynamics. In order to solve the game iteratively in a manner that reflects the interaction structure, we study learning dynamics in which the player deemed the leader updates its parameters using the total derivative of its objective defined using the implicit function theorem and the player deemed the follower updates using the typical individual gradient dynamics. We refer to this gradient-based learning method as the Stackelberg gradient dynamics. The designations of leader and follower between the actor and critic can result in distinct game-theoretic outcomes and we explore both choices and explain how the proper roles depend on the respective objective functions.

Theoretical Contributions. The Stackelberg gradient dynamics were previously studied in general nonconvex games and enjoy a number of theoretical guarantees (Fiez, Chasnov, and Ratliff 2020). In this paper we tailor the analysis of this learning dynamic to the reinforcement learning problem. To do this, we begin by developing a policy gradient theorem for the total derivative update (Theorem 1). Then, building off of this result, we develop a meta-framework of Stackelberg actor-critic algorithms. Specifically, this framework adapts the standard actor-critic, deep deterministic policy gradient, and soft-actor critic algorithms to be optimized using the Stackelberg gradient dynamics in place of the usual individual gradient dynamics. For the Stackelberg actor-critic algorithms this meta-framework admits, we prove local convergence (Theorem 2) to local Stackelberg equilibrium.

Experimental Contributions. From an empirical stand-
point, we begin by pointing out in Section 3 that the objective functions in actor-critic algorithms commonly exhibit a type of hidden structure in terms of the parameters. Given this observation, we develop simple, yet illustrative examples comparing the behavior of Stackelberg actor-critic algorithms with standard actor-critic algorithms. In particular, we observe that the Stackelberg dynamics mitigate cycling in the parameter space and accelerate convergence. We discover from extensive experiments on OpenAI gym environments that similar observations carry over to complex problems and that our Stackelberg actor-critic algorithms always perform at least as well and often significantly outperform the standard actor-critic algorithm counterparts.

2 Related Work

Game-theoretic frameworks have been studied extensively in reinforcement learning but mostly in multi-agent setting (Yang and Wang 2020). In multi-agent reinforcement learning, the decentralized learning scheme is mostly adopted in practice (Zhang, Yang, and Başar 2021), where agents typically behave independently and optimize their own objective without explicit information exchange. A shortcoming of this method is that agents fail to consider the learning process of other agents and simply treat them as a static component of the environment (Hernandez-Leal et al. 2017). To resolve this, several works design learning algorithms that explicitly account for the learning behavior of other agents (Zhang and Lesser 2010; Foerster et al. 2018; Letcher et al. 2018), which is shown to improve learning stability and induce cooperation. In contrast, Prajapat et al. (2021) study a competitive policy optimization method for multi-agent reinforcement learning, which performs recursive reasoning about the behavior of opponents to exploit them in two-player zero-sum games. Zhang et al. (2020) study multi-agent reinforcement learning problems, where each agent is using a typical actor-critic algorithm, with the twist that the follower’s policy takes the leader’s action as an input, which is used to approximate the potential best response. However, the procedure reduces to the usual actor-critic algorithm when applied to a single-agent reinforcement learning problem.

The past research taking a game-theoretic viewpoint of single-agent reinforcement learning is limited despite the fact that there is often implicitly multiple players in reinforcement learning algorithms. Rajeswaran, Mordatch, and Kumar (2020) propose a framework that casts model-based reinforcement learning as a two-player general-sum Stackelberg game between a policy player and a model player. However, they only consider optimizing the objective of each player using the typical individual gradient dynamics with timescale separation as an approximation to Stackelberg gradient dynamics. Concurrent with this work, Wen et al. (2021) show that Stackelberg policy gradient recovers the standard policy gradient under certain strong assumptions, including that the critic is directly parameterized by the $Q$-value function. Hong et al. (2020) analyze the Stackelberg gradient dynamics with timescale separation for bilevel optimization with application to reinforcement learning. For reinforcement learning, they give a convergence guarantee for an actor-critic algorithm under assumptions such as exact linear function approxima-

3 Motivation & Preliminaries

In this section, we begin by presenting background on Stackelberg games and the relevant equilibrium concept. Then, to motivate and illustrate the utility of Stackelberg-based actor-critic algorithms, we highlight a key hidden structure that exists in actor-critic objective formulations and explore the behavior of Stackelberg gradient dynamics in comparison to individual gradient dynamics given this design. Finally, we provide the necessary mathematical background and formalism for actor-critic reinforcement learning algorithms.

3.1 Game-Theoretic Preliminaries

A Stackelberg game is a game between two agents where one agent is deemed the leader and the other the follower. Each agent has an objective they want to optimize that depends on not only their own actions but also on the actions of the other agent. Specifically, the leader optimizes its objective under the assumption that the follower will play a best response. Let $f_1(x_1, x_2)$ and $f_2(x_1, x_2)$ be the objective functions that the leader and follower want to minimize, respectively, where $x_1 \in X_1 \subseteq \mathbb{R}^d$ and $x_2 \in X_2 \subseteq \mathbb{R}^d$ are their decision variables or strategies and $x = (x_1, x_2) \in X_1 \times X_2$ is their joint strategy. The leader and follower aim to solve the following problems:

$$\min_{x_1 \in X_1} \{f_1(x_1, x_2) \mid x_2 \in \arg\min_{y \in X_2} f_2(x_1, y)\}, \quad (L)$$

$$\min_{x_2 \in X_2} f_2(x_1, x_2). \quad (F)$$

Since the leader assumes the follower chooses a best response $x_2^*(x_1) = \arg\min_{y \in X_2} f_2(x_1, y)$, the follower’s decision variables are implicitly a function of the leader’s. In deriving sufficient conditions for the optimization problem in $(L)$, the leader utilizes this information by the total derivative of its cost function which is given by

$$\nabla f_1(x_1, x_2^*(x_1)) = \nabla_1 f_1(x) + (\nabla x_2^*(x_1))^{\top} \nabla_2 f_1(x),$$

where $\nabla x_2^*(x_1) = - (\nabla_2^2 f_2(x))^{-1} \nabla_2 f_1(x)$.  

Hence, a point $x = (x_1, x_2)$ is a local solution to $(L)$ if $\nabla f_1(x_1, x_2^*(x_1)) = 0$ and $\nabla^2 f_1(x_1, x_2^*(x_1)) > 0$. For the follower’s problem, sufficient conditions for optimality are $\nabla_2 f_2(x_1, x_2) = 0$ and $\nabla^2 f_2(x_1, x_2) > 0$. This gives rise to the following equilibrium concept which characterizes sufficient conditions for a local Stackelberg equilibrium.

\[1\] Under sufficient regularity conditions on the follower’s optimization problem, the best response map is a singleton. This is a generic condition in games (Ratliff, Burden, and Sastry 2014; Fiez, Chasnov, and Ratliff 2020).

\[2\] The partial derivative of $f(x_1, x_2)$ with respect to the $x_1$ is denoted by $\nabla_1 f(x_1, x_2)$ and the total derivative of $f(x_1, h(x_1))$ for some function $h$, is denoted $\nabla f$ where $\nabla f(x_1, h(x_1)) = \nabla_1 f(x_1, h(x_1)) + (\nabla h(x_1))^\top \nabla_2 f(x_1, h(x_1))$. 


Definition 1 (Differential Stackelberg Equilibrium, Fiez, Chasnov, and Ratliff 2020). The joint strategy \( x^* = (x_1^*, x_2^*) \in X_1 \times X_2 \) is a differential Stackelberg equilibrium if \( \nabla f_1(x^*) = 0, \nabla^2 f_2(x^*) = 0, \nabla^2 f_1(x^*) > 0, \) and \( \nabla^2 f_2(x^*) > 0 \).

The Stackelberg learning dynamics derive from the first-order gradient-based sufficient conditions and are given by

\[
\begin{align*}
    x_{1,k+1} &= x_{1,k} - \alpha_1 \nabla f_1(x_{1,k}, x_{2,k}) \\
    x_{2,k+1} &= x_{2,k} - \alpha_2 \nabla^2 f_2(x_{1,k}, x_{2,k})
\end{align*}
\]

where \( \alpha_i, i = 1, 2 \) are the leader and follower learning rates.

3.2 Motivating Examples

In the next section we present several common actor-critic formulations including the “vanilla” actor-critic, deep deterministic policy gradient, and soft actor-critic. A common theme among them is that the actor and critic objectives exhibit a simple hidden structure in the parameters. In particular, the actor objective typically has a hidden linear structure in terms of the parameters \( \theta \) which is abstractly of the form \( Q_w(\theta) = w^\top \mu(\theta) \). Analogously, the critic objective usually has a hidden quadratic structure in the parameters \( w \) which is abstractly of the form \( (R(\theta) - Q_w(\theta))^2 \). The terminology of hidden structure in this context refers to the fact that the specified structure appears when the functions transforming the parameters are removed.\(^1\) Interestingly, similar observations have been made regarding generative adversarial network formulations and exploited to gain insights into gradient learning dynamics for optimizing them (Vlatakis-Gkaragkounis, Flokas, and Piliouras 2019; Flokas, Vlatakis-Gkaragkounis, and Piliouras 2021).

Based on this observation, we investigate simple, yet illustrative reinforcement learning problems with the aforementioned structure and compare and contrast the behavior of the Stackelberg gradient dynamics with the usual individual gradient dynamics. As we demonstrate later in Section 5, the insights we uncover from this study generally carry over to complex reinforcement learning problems.

\(^1\)The actor and critic functions could be approximated by neural nets in practice but we consider the simplest linear case, which captures the hidden structure and gives insights for general cases.
importance of considering how game dynamics perform on types of hidden structures when optimizing actor-critic algorithms in reinforcement learning.

Further details on the examples in this section are provided in Appendix A. Importantly, regardless of the objective function structure, the Stackelberg gradient dynamics tend to converge rather directly to the equilibrium and for some hidden structures they significantly mitigate oscillations and stabilize training. It is well-known that this is a desirable property of the reinforcement learning algorithms to the implications for both evaluation and real-world applications (Chan et al. 2019). Together, this motivating section suggests that introducing the Stackelberg dynamics as a “meta-algorithm” on existing actor-critic methods is likely to lead to more favorable convergence properties. We demonstrate this empirically in Section 5, while now we introduce actor-critic algorithms.

3.3 Actor-Critic Algorithms

We consider discrete-time Markov decision processes (MDPs) with continuous state space $S$ and continuous action space $A$. We denote the state and action at time step $t$ by $s_t$ and $a_t$, respectively. The initial state $s_0$ is determined by the initial state density $s_0 \sim \rho(s)$. At time step $t$, the agent in state $s_t$ takes an action $a_t$ according to a policy $a_t \sim \pi(\cdot|s_t)$ and obtains a reward $r_t = r(s_t, a_t)$. The agent then transitions to state $s_{t+1}$ determined by the transition function $s_{t+1} \sim P(s'|s_t, a_t)$. A trajectory $\tau = (s_0, a_0, \ldots, s_T, a_T)$ gives the cumulative rewards or return defined as $R(\tau) = \sum_{t=0}^{T} \gamma^t r(s_t, a_t)$, where the discount factor $0 < \gamma \leq 1$ assigns weights to rewards received at different time steps. The expected return of $\pi$ after executing $a_t$ in state $s_t$ can be expressed by the $Q$ function:

$$Q^\pi(s_t, a_t) = \mathbb{E}_{\tau \sim \pi} \left[ \sum_{\tau=0}^{T} \gamma^{T-t} r(s_t, a_t) | s_t, a_t \right].$$

Correspondingly, the expected return of $\pi$ in state $s_t$ can be expressed by the value function $V$ defined as:

$$V^\pi(s_t) = \mathbb{E}_{\tau \sim \pi} \left[ \sum_{\tau=0}^{T} \gamma^{T-t} r(s_t, a_t) | s_t \right].$$

The goal of reinforcement learning is to find an optimal policy that maximizes the expected return which is given by:

$$J(\pi) = \mathbb{E}_{\tau \sim \pi} \left[ \sum_{\tau=0}^{T} \gamma^{T-t} r(s_t, a_t) | \pi \right] = \int_{\pi} \mathbb{E}_{s \sim \rho, a \sim \pi(\cdot|s)} \left[ Q^\pi(s, a) \right] \pi(a) \, \text{d}a,$$

where $\mathbb{E}_{\tau \sim \pi}$ denotes the expected return of the policy $\pi$ by the parameter $\theta$ and finds the optimal parameter choice $\theta^*$ by maximizing the expected return:

$$J(\theta) = \mathbb{E}_{s \sim \rho, a \sim \pi(\cdot|s)} \left[ Q^\pi(s, a) \right].$$

This optimization problem can be solved by gradient ascent. By the policy gradient theorem (Sutton et al. 2000),

$$\nabla_{\theta} J(\theta) = \mathbb{E}_{s \sim \rho, a \sim \pi(\cdot|s)} \left[ \nabla_{\theta} \log \pi(\cdot|s) Q^\pi(s, a) \right],$$

where $\nabla_{\theta} \log \pi(\cdot|s)$ is the policy gradient with respect to $\theta$. A common method to approximate $Q^\pi(s, a)$ in the policy gradient is by sampling trajectories and averaging returns, which is known as REINFORCE (Williams 1992).

“Vanilla” Actor-Critic (AC). The actor-critic method (Konda and Tsitsiklis 2000; Grondman et al. 2012) relies on a critic function $Q_w(s, a)$ parameterized by $w$ to approximate $Q^\pi(s, a)$. By replacing $Q_\pi(s, a)$ with $Q^\pi(s, a)$ in (1), the actor which is parameterized by $\theta$ has the objective:

$$J(\theta, w) = \mathbb{E}_{s \sim \rho, a \sim \pi(\cdot|s)} \left[ Q^\pi(s, a) \right].$$

The objective is optimized using gradient ascent where

$$\nabla_{\theta} J(\theta, w) = \mathbb{E}_{s \sim \rho, a \sim \pi(\cdot|s)} \left[ \nabla_{\theta} \log \pi(\cdot|s) Q^\pi(s, a) \right].$$

The critic which is parameterized by $w$ has the objective to minimize the mean square error between the $Q$-functions:

$$J(\theta, w) = \mathbb{E}_{s \sim \rho, a \sim \pi(\cdot|s)} \left[ (Q^\pi(s, a) - Q^\pi(s, a))^2 \right],$$

where the function $Q^\pi(s, a)$ is approximated by Monte Carlo estimation or bootstrapping (Sutton and Barto 2018).

The actor-critic method optimizes the objectives with individual gradient dynamics (Peters and Schaal 2008; Mnih et al. 2016) which gives rise to the updates:

$$\theta \leftarrow \theta + \alpha_\theta \nabla_{\theta} J(\theta, w),$$

$$w \leftarrow w - \alpha_w \nabla_{w} J(\theta, w),$$

where $\alpha_\theta$ and $\alpha_w$ are the learning rates of actor and critic. Clearly, even in this basic actor-critic method, the actor and critic are coupled since $J$ and $L$ depend on both $\theta$ and $w$, which naturally lends to a game-theoretic interpretation.

Deep Deterministic Policy Gradient (DDPG). The DDPG algorithm (Lillicrap et al. 2016) is an off-policy method with subtly different objective functions for the actor and critic. In particular, the formulation has a deterministic actor $\mu_\theta(s) : S \to A$ with the objective:

$$J(\theta, w) = \mathbb{E}_{\tau \sim D} \left[ Q_w(s, \mu_\theta(s)) \right].$$

The critic objective is the mean square Bellman error

$$L(\theta, w) = \mathbb{E}_{s, a \sim D} \left[ (Q_w(s, a) - (r + \gamma Q_0(s', \mu_\theta(s'))) )^2 \right],$$

where $\xi = (s, a, r, s')$, $D$ is a replay buffer, and $Q_0$ is a target Q network.

Soft Actor-Critic (SAC). The SAC algorithm (Haarnoja et al. 2018) exploits the double Q-learning trick (Van Hasselt, Guez, and Silver 2016) and employs entropic regularization to encourage exploration. The actor’s objective $J(\theta, w)$ is

$$E_{s \sim D} \left[ \min_{i=1,2} Q_{w_i}(s, a_\theta(s)) - \eta \log (\pi(\cdot|s)) \right],$$

where $a_\theta(s)$ is a sample from $\pi_\theta(\cdot|s)$ and $\eta$ is entropy regularization coefficient. The parameter of the critic is the union of both Q networks parameters $w = \{w_1, w_2\}$ and the critic objective is defined correspondingly by

$$L(\theta, w) = \mathbb{E}_{s \sim D} \left[ \sum_{i=1,2} (Q_{w_i}(s, a) - y(r, s'))^2 \right],$$

where $y(r, s') = r + \gamma \left( \min_{i=1,2} Q_{w_i}(s', a_\theta(s')) - \eta \log (\pi(\cdot|s')) \right)$.

The target networks in DDPG and SAC are updated by taking the Polyak average of the network parameters over the course of training, and the actor and critic networks are updated by individual gradient dynamics identical to (5)–(6).

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4In the DDPG algorithm, the next-state actions used in the target network come from the target policy instead of the current policy. To be consistent with SAC, we use the current policy.
Algorithm 1: Stackelberg Actor-Critic Framework

Input: actor-critic algorithm ALG, player designations, and learning rate sequences \( \alpha_{\theta, k}, \alpha_{w, k} \).

If actor is leader, update actor and critic in ALG with:

\[
\begin{align*}
\theta_{k+1} &= \theta_k + \alpha_{\theta, k} \nabla J(\theta_k, w_k) \\
w_{k+1} &= w_k - \alpha_{w, k} \nabla_w L(\theta_k, w_k)
\end{align*}
\]

(11)

If critic is leader, update actor and critic in ALG with:

\[
\begin{align*}
\theta_{k+1} &= \theta_k + \alpha_{\theta, k} \nabla \theta \nabla J(\theta_k, w_k) \\
w_{k+1} &= w_k - \alpha_{w, k} \nabla L(\theta_k, w_k)
\end{align*}
\]

(12)

When the critic is the leader the dynamics are given by (13)–(14) where the critic’s total derivative \( \nabla L(\theta, w) \) is

\[
\nabla_w L(\theta, w) - \nabla^\top \nabla \theta J(\theta, w)(\nabla^2_w L(\theta, w))^{-1} \nabla \theta J(\theta, w).
\]

(16)

4 Stackelberg Framework

In this section, we begin by formulating the actor-critic interaction as two-player general-sum Stackelberg game and introduce a Stackelberg framework for actor-critic algorithms, under which we develop novel Stackelberg versions of existing algorithms: Stackelberg actor-critic (STAC), Stackelberg deep deterministic policy gradient (STDPPG), and Stackelberg soft actor-critic (STSSAC). Following this, we give a local convergence guarantee for the algorithms to a local Stackelberg equilibrium. Finally, a regularization method for practical usage of the algorithms is discussed.

4.1 Meta-Algorithm

Given an actor-critic formulation, in particular, the objectives of the actor and critic defined by \( J(\theta, w) \) and \( L(\theta, w) \), we can interpret the problem as a two-player general-sum Stackelberg game. If we view the actor as the leader and the critic as a follower, then the players aim to solve the following optimization problems, respectively:

\[
\begin{align*}
\max_{\theta} \{ J(\theta, w^*(\theta)) \} &\quad | \quad \min_{w} \{ L(\theta, w) \} \quad \text{(AL)} \\
\min_{w} \{ L(\theta^*(w), w) \} &\quad | \quad \max_{\theta} \{ J(\theta^*(w), \theta) \} \quad \text{(CL)}
\end{align*}
\]

(13) (14)

On the other hand, if we view the critic as the leader and the actor as the follower, then the players aim to solve the following optimization problems, respectively:

\[
\begin{align*}
\min_{w} \{ L(\theta^*(w), w) \} &\quad | \quad \max_{\theta} \{ J(\theta^*(w), \theta) \} \quad \text{(AF)}
\end{align*}
\]

As described in Section 3.1, we propose to optimize the objectives using a learning algorithm that accounts for the structure of the problems. Specifically, since the leader assumes the follower selects a best response, it is natural to optimize the leader objective by following the total derivative given that the follower’s decision is implicitly a function of the leader’s. The meta-framework we adopt for Stackelberg refinements of actor-critic methods is in Algorithm 1. The distinction compared to the usual actor-critic methods is that in the updates we replace the individual gradient for the leader by the implicitly defined total derivative which accounts for the interaction structure whereas the rest of the actor-critic method remains identical.

The dynamics with the actor as the leader are given by (11)–(12) where the actor’s total derivative \( J(\theta, w) \) is

\[
\nabla \theta J(\theta, w) - \nabla^\top \nabla \theta J(\theta, w)(\nabla^2 \theta J(\theta, w))^{-1} \nabla \theta J(\theta, w).
\]

(15)

4.2 Stackelberg “Vanilla” Actor-Critic

We start by instantiating the Stackelberg meta-algorithm for the “vanilla” actor-critic (AC) algorithm for which the actor and critic objectives are given in (2) and (4), respectively. We only demonstrate the “vanilla” actor-critic algorithm and its Stackelberg version here and in our experiments, but the framework could be generalized to more on-policy actor-critic algorithms (e.g., A2C, A3C, Mnih et al. 2016).
4.3 Stackelberg DDPG and SAC

In comparison to on-policy methods where the critic is designed to evaluate the actor using sampled trajectories generated by the current policy, in off-policy methods the critic minimizes the Bellman error using samples from a replay buffer. Thus, the leader and follower designation between the actor and critic in off-policy methods is not as clear. To this end, we propose variants of STDDPG and STSAC where the leader and follower order can be switched. Given the actor as the leader (AL), the algorithms are similar to policy-based methods, where the critic plays an approximate best response to evaluate the current actor. On the other hand, given the critic as the leader (CL), the actor plays an approximate best response to the critic value, resulting in behavior closely resembling that of the value-based methods.

As shown in (7)–(8) for DDPG and (9)–(10) for SAC, the objective functions of off-policy methods are defined in expectation over an arbitrary distribution from a replay buffer instead of the distribution induced by the current policy. Thus, each terms in the total derivatives in (15) and (16) can be computed directly and estimated by samples. Then, STDDPG and STSAC update using (11)–(12) or (13)–(14) depending on the choices of leader and follower.

4.4 Convergence Guarantee

Consider, without loss of generality, the actor is designated as the leader and the critic the follower. Then, the actor and critic updates with the Stackelberg gradient dynamics and learning rates sequences \( \{\alpha_{\theta,k}\}, \{\omega_{k}\} \) are of the form

\[
\begin{align*}
\theta_{k+1} &= \theta_k + \alpha_{\theta,k}(\nabla J(\theta, w) + \epsilon_{\theta,k+1}), \\
w_{k+1} &= w_k - \omega_{k}(\nabla_w L(\theta, w) + \epsilon_{w,k+1}),
\end{align*}
\]

where \( \{\epsilon_{\theta,k+1}\}, \{\epsilon_{w,k+1}\} \) are stochastic processes. The results in this section assume the following.

**Assumption 1.** The maps \( \nabla J : \mathbb{R}^m \to \mathbb{R}^{m_\theta}, \nabla_w L : \mathbb{R}^m \to \mathbb{R}^{m_w} \) are Lipschitz, and \( \|\nabla J\| < \infty \). The learning rate sequences are such that \( \alpha_{\theta,k} = o(\omega_{k}) \) and \( \sum_k \alpha_{\theta,k} = \infty \), \( \sum_k \alpha_{w,k} < \infty \) for \( i \in \mathcal{I} = \{\theta, w\} \). The noise processes \( \{\epsilon_{\theta,k}\}, \{\epsilon_{w,k}\} \) are zero mean, martingale difference sequences: given the filtration \( \mathcal{F}_k = \sigma(\theta_s, w_s, \theta_{s:k}, w_{s:k}, s \leq k) \), \( \{\epsilon_{\theta,k}\}, \{\epsilon_{w,k}\} \in \mathcal{I} \) are conditionally independent, \( \mathbb{E}[^{\epsilon_{\theta,k+1}}_k \| \mathcal{F}_k] = 0 \) a.s., and \( \mathbb{E}[^{\epsilon_{w,k+1}}_k \| \mathcal{F}_k] = 0 \) a.s. for some constants \( c_i \geq 0 \) and \( i \in \mathcal{I} \).

The following result gives a local convergence guarantee to a local Stackelberg equilibrium under the assumptions and the proof is in Appendix D. For this result, recall that for a continuous-time dynamical system of the form \( \dot{z} = -g(z) \), a stationary point \( z^* \) of the system is said to be locally asymptotically stable or simply stable if the spectrum of the Jacobian denoted by \(-Dg(z)\) is in the open left half plane.

**Theorem 2.** Consider an MDP and actor-critic parameters \((\theta, w)\). Given a locally asymptotically stable differential Stackelberg equilibrium \((\theta^*, w^*)\) of the continuous-time limiting system \((\theta, w) = (\nabla J(\theta, w), -\nabla_w L(\theta, w))\), under Assumption 1 there exists a neighborhood \( U \) for which the iterates \((\theta_k, w_k)\) of the discrete-time system in (17)–(18) converge asymptotically almost surely to \((\theta^*, w^*)\) for \((\theta_0, w_0) \in U \).

This result is effectively giving the guarantee that the discrete-time dynamics locally converge to a stable, game theoretically meaningful equilibrium of the continuous-time system using stochastic approximation methods given proper learning rates and unbiased gradient estimates (Borkar 2009).

4.5 Implicit Map Regularization

The total derivative in the Stackelberg gradient dynamics requires computing the inverse of follower Hessian \( \nabla^2_{w} f_2(x) \). Since critic networks in practical reinforcement learning problems may be highly non-convex, \( \nabla^2_{w} f_2(x) \) is used to stabilize the critic. Thus, instead of computing this term directly in the Stackelberg actor-critic algorithms, we compute a regularized variant of the form \( \nabla^2_{w} f_2(x) + \lambda I^{-1} \nabla w f_2(x) \). This regularization method can be interpreted as the leader viewing the follower as optimizing a regularized cost \( f_2(x) + \frac{\lambda}{2} \| w \|^2 \), while the follower actually optimizes \( f_2(x) \). The regularization \( \lambda \) can interpolate between the Stackelberg and individual gradient updates for the leader as we now formalize.

**Proposition 2.** Consider a Stackelberg game where the leader updates using the regularized total derivative \( \nabla^2 \lambda f_1(x) = \nabla_1 f_1(x) - \nabla^2_{w} f_2(x) \nabla^2_{w} f_2(x) + \lambda I^{-1} \nabla w f_2(x) \). As \( \lambda \to 0 \) then \( \nabla^2 \lambda f_1(x) \to \nabla f_1(x) \) and when \( \lambda \to \infty \) then \( \nabla^2 \lambda f_1(x) \to \nabla_1 f_1(x) \).

5 Experiments

We now show the results of extensive experiments comparing the Stackelberg actor-critic algorithms with the comparable actor-critic algorithms. We find that the actor-critic algorithms with the Stackelberg gradient dynamics always perform at least as well and often significantly outperform the standard gradient dynamics. Moreover, we provide game-theoretic interpretations of the results.

We run experiments on the OpenAI gym platform (Brockman et al. 2016) with the Mujoco Physics simulator (Todorov, Erez, and Tassa 2012). The performance of each algorithm is evaluated by the average episode return versus the number of time steps (state transitions after taking an action according to the policy). For a fair comparison, the hyper-parameters for the actor and critic including the neural network architectures are set equal when comparing the Stackelberg actor-critic algorithms with the standard normal actor-critic algorithms. The implementation details are in Appendix E, and importantly, the Stackelberg actor-critic algorithms are not significantly more computationally expensive than the normal algorithms.

**Performance.** Figures 2(a)–2(d) show the performance of STAC and \( \mathcal{AC} \) on several tasks. We also experiment with the common heuristic of “unrolling” the critic \( m \) steps between actor steps. For each task, STAC with multiple critic unrolling steps performs the best. This is due to the fact when the critic is closer to the best response, then the real response of the critic is closer to what is anticipated by the Stackelberg gradient for the actor. Interestingly, in Cartpole, \( \mathcal{AC} \) with \( m = 1 \) performs even better than \( \mathcal{AC} \) with \( m = 80 \).

Figures 2(e)–2(h) show the performance of STDDPG-AL and STDDPG-CL in comparison to DDPG. We observe that on each task, STDDPG-AL outperforms DDPG by a clear margin, whereas STDDPG-CL has overall better performance than
DDPG except on Walker2d. Figures 2(i)–2(l) show the performance of STSAC-AL and STSAC-CL in comparison to SAC.

In all experiments, when the actor is the leader, the Stackelberg versions either outperform or are comparable to the existing actor-critic algorithms, offering compelling evidence that the Stackelberg framework has an empirical advantage in many tasks and settings. We now provide game-theoretic interpretations of the experimental results and connect back to the examples and observations from Section 3.2.

**Game-Theoretic Interpretations.** SAC is considered the state-of-the-art model-free reinforcement learning algorithm and we observe it significantly outperforms DDPG (e.g., on Hopper and Walker2d). The common interpretation of its advantage is that SAC encourages exploration by penalizing low entropy policies. Here we provide another viewpoint.

From a game-theoretic perspective, the objective functions of AC and DDPG take on hidden linear and hidden quadratic structures for the actor and critic. This structure can result in cyclic behavior for individual gradient dynamics as shown in Section 3.2. SAC constructs a more well-conditioned game structure by regularizing the actor objective, which leads to the learning dynamics converging more directly to the equilibrium as seen in Section 3.2. This also explains why we observe improved performance with STAC and STDPPG-AL compared to AC and DDPG, but the performance gap between STSAC-AL and SAC is not as significant.

Comparing AL with CL, the actor as the leader always outperforms the critic as the leader in our experiments. As described in Section 3.2, the critic objective is typically a quadratic mean square error objective, which results in a hidden quadratic structure, whereas the actor’s objective typically has a hidden linear structure due to parameterization of the Q network and policy. Thus, the critic cost structure is more well-suited for computing an approximate local best response since it is more likely to be well-conditioned, and so the critic as the follower is the more natural hierarchical game structure. Unrolling the critic for multiple steps to approximate this structure and has been shown to perform well empirically (Schulman et al. 2015a). Algorithm 2 (Appendix E) describes this method for the Stackelberg framework.

6 Conclusion

We revisit the standard actor-critic algorithms from a game-theoretic perspective to capture the hierarchical interaction structure and introduce a Stackelberg framework for actor-critic algorithms. In this framework, we introduce novel Stackelberg versions of existing actor-critic algorithms. In experiments on a number of environments, we show that the Stackelberg actor-critic algorithms always outperform the existing counterparts when the actor plays the leader.
References

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