Learning Payoff Functions in Infinite Games

Yevgeniy Vorobeychik, Michael P. Wellman, and Satinder Singh

We consider a class of games with real-valued strategies and payoff information available only in the form of data from a given sample of strategy profiles. Solving such games with respect to the underlying strategy space requires generalizing from the data to a complete payoff-function representation. We address payoff-function learning as a standard regression problem, with provision for capturing known structure (symmetry) in the multiagent environment. To measure learning performance, we consider the relative utility of prescribed strategies, rather than the accuracy of payoff functions per se. We demonstrate our approach and evaluate its effectiveness on two examples: a two-player version of the first-price sealed-bid auction (with known analytical form), and a five-player market-based scheduling game (with no known solution).

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