User-Agent Value Alignment

Daniel Shapiro and Ross Shachter

The principal-agent problem concerns delegation in the absence of trust. Given a principal and an agent with different value structures, the principal wants to motivate the agent to address the principal’s aims by providing appropriate incentives. We address this problem in the context of a real-world complication, where the principal and agent lack a common problem frame. This context is especially relevant when the principal is a user, and the agent is a technological artifact with a limited repertoire of percepts and actions. We identify necessary conditions for establishing trust between such disparate actors, and we show, via a constructive proof, that it is always possible to create these necessary conditions. We conclude with several distinctions that let the principal rank the expected quality of agent behavior.

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