AAAI Publications, Twenty-Fifth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence

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Manipulation of Nanson's and Baldwin's Rules
Nina Narodytska, Toby Walsh, Lirong Xia

Last modified: 2011-08-04


Nanson's and Baldwin's voting rules selecta winner by successively eliminatingcandidates with low Borda scores. We showthat these rules have a number of desirablecomputational properties. In particular,with unweighted votes, it isNP-hard to manipulate either rule with one manipulator, whilstwith weighted votes, it isNP-hard to manipulate either rule with a small number ofcandidates and a coalition of manipulators.As only a couple of other voting rulesare known to be NP-hard to manipulatewith a single manipulator, Nanson'sand Baldwin's rules appearto be particularly resistant to manipulation from a theoretical perspective.We also propose a number of approximation methodsfor manipulating these two rules.Experiments demonstrate that both rules areoften difficult to manipulate in practice.These results suggest that elimination stylevoting rules deserve further study.

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