AAAI Publications, Twenty-Eighth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence

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A Characterization of the Single-Peaked Single-Crossing Domain
Edith Elkind, Piotr Faliszewski, Piotr Skowron

Last modified: 2014-06-21

Abstract


We investigate elections that are simultaneously single-peaked and single-crossing (SPSC). We show that the domain of 1-dimensional Euclidean elections (where voters and candidates are points on the real line, and each voter prefers the candidates that are close to her to the ones that are further away) is a proper subdomain of the SPSC domain, by constructing an election that is single-peaked and single-crossing, but not 1-Euclidean. We then establish a connection between narcissistic elections (where each candidate is ranked first by at least one voter), single-peaked elections and single-crossing elections, by showing that an election is SPSC if and only if it can be obtained from a narcissistic single-crossing election by deleting voters. We show two applications of our characterization.

Keywords


single-peaked preferences; single-crossing preferences; euclidean preferences

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