

Audit Games with Multiple Defender Resources

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Abstract

Modern organizations (e.g., hospitals, social networks, government agencies) rely heavily on audit to detect and punish insiders who inappropriately access and disclose confidential information. Recent work on *audit games* models the strategic interaction between an auditor with a single audit resource and auditees as a Stackelberg game, augmenting associated well-studied security games with a configurable punishment parameter. We significantly generalize this audit game model to account for multiple audit resources where each resource is restricted to audit a subset of all potential violations, thus enabling application to practical auditing scenarios. We provide an FPTAS that computes an approximately optimal solution to the resulting non-convex optimization problem. The main technical novelty is in the design and correctness proof of an optimization transformation that enables the construction of this FPTAS. In addition, we experimentally demonstrate that this transformation significantly speeds up computation of solutions for a class of audit games and security games.

1 Introduction

Modern organizations (e.g., hospitals, banks, social networks, search engines) that hold large volumes of personal information rely heavily on auditing for privacy protection. These audit mechanisms combine automated methods with human input to detect and punish violators. Since human audit resources are limited, and often not sufficient to investigate all potential violations, current state-of-the-art audit tools provide heuristics to guide human effort (Fairwarning 2011). However, numerous reports of privacy breaches caused by malicious insiders bring to question the effectiveness of these audit mechanisms (Ponemon Institute 2011; 2012).

Recent work on *audit games* by Blocki et al. (2013) approaches a piece of this problem using game-theoretic techniques. Their thesis is that effective human audit resource allocation and punishment levels can be efficiently computed by modeling the audit process as a game between an auditor and auditees. At a technical level, their audit game model augments a well-studied Stackelberg security games model (Tambe 2011) with a configurable punishment parameter. The auditor (henceforth called the *defender*) can audit

one of n potential violations (referred to as *targets*). The defender’s optimal strategy is a randomized auditing policy—a distribution over targets such that when the attacker best responds the defender’s utility is maximized. The novel ingredient of the audit games model is a punishment level, chosen by the defender, which specifies how severely the adversary will be punished if he is caught. The defender may try to set a high punishment level in order to deter the adversary. However, punishment is not free. The defender incurs a cost for punishing, e.g. punishments such as suspension or firing of violators require maintaining resources for hiring and training of replacements. Blocki et al. (2013) provide an efficient algorithm for computing an optimal strategy for the defender to commit to.

While this work distills the essence of the defender’s dilemma in auditing situations, it is too restricted to inform real-world audit strategies. In typical audit settings, the defender has *multiple resources* using which she can audit a subset of the targets (not just one target). Furthermore, each resource may be *restricted* in the targets that it can audit. For example, some organizations follow hierarchical audit strategies in which a manager is only required to audit potential violations committed by her direct reports. Similarly, specialized audits are common, for example, employing disjoint audit resources to detect finance-related and privacy-related violations.

Our Contributions. We present a generalized Stackelberg audit game model that accounts for multiple audit resources where each resource is restricted to audit a subset of all potential violations, thus enabling application to the practical auditing scenarios described above. Our main theoretical result is a *fully polynomial time approximation scheme (FPTAS)* to compute an approximate solution to the resulting non-convex optimization problem.

To arrive at this FPTAS, we begin with a simple *fixed parameter tractable (FPT) algorithm* that reduces the non-convex optimization problem to a linear programming problem by fixing the punishment parameter at a discrete value. Since we perform a linear search over all possible discrete values of the punishment parameter over a fixed range in increasing intervals of size ϵ , we get an FPT algorithm once the bit precision is fixed.

Next we present an *optimization transformation* that reduces the number of variables in the optimization problem

at the cost of generating additional constraints. We also provide sufficient conditions that guarantee that the number of constraints is polynomial in size. Significantly, these conditions are satisfied in important practical auditing scenarios, including the hierarchical and specialized audit settings discussed earlier. The design and correctness proof of this optimization transformation constitutes the central novel technical contribution of this paper. Finally, we present an FPTAS to compute the defender’s strategy leveraging the output of the optimization transformation when it generates a polynomial number of constraints.

In addition to its role in enabling the design of an FPTAS, a practical motivation for designing the optimization transformation is its promise of speeding up computing game solutions using the FPT algorithm. We experimentally demonstrate that the transformation produces speedups of up to $3\times$ for audit game instances and over $100\times$ for associated security game instances. In general, the speedups are higher as the problem size increases.

As an additional contribution, we consider audit scenarios where the defender can set a different punishment level for each target instead of setting a single, universal punishment level. We provide an FPT algorithm for this problem by designing a novel reduction of this setting to a second order cone program (SOCP).

Related Work. Our work is most closely related to the paper of Blocki et al (2013). We elaborate on the technical connections in the exposition and analysis of our results.

Our work is also closely related to work on security games (Tambe 2011). The basic approach to solving security games, and Stackelberg games more generally (where a leader chooses an optimal strategy, i.e., one that maximizes its utility assuming that the follower best responds) was introduced by Conitzer and Sandholm (2006); it does not scale well when the number of defender strategies is exponentially large, as is the case in most security games. Typical algorithms rely on formulating a mixed integer linear program, and employing heuristics; these algorithms do not provide provable running-time guarantees (see, e.g., Paruchuri et al. (2009); Kiekintveld et al. (2009)). Often the problem is solved just for the coverage probabilities or marginals (probability of defending a target) with the hope that it would be implementable (i.e., decomposable into a valid distribution over allocations). In contrast, Korzhyk et al. (2010) give a polynomial time algorithm for security games where the attacker has multiple resources, each of which can only protect one target at a time (this restriction is known as *singleton schedules*). Their main tool is the Birkhoff-Von Neumann Theorem, which we also apply.

All our algorithms have theoretical results about their efficiency. Our optimization transformation transforms the problem to one with only coverage probabilities as variables and adds additional constraints for the coverage probabilities that restricts feasible coverage probabilities to be implementable. Thus, in contrast with Korzhyk et al. (2010) our problem has much fewer variables at the cost of additional constraints. Also, the punishment parameter makes our problem non-convex, and so our algorithms must leverage a suite of additional techniques.

2 The Audit Games Model

An audit game features two players: the defender (D), and the adversary (A). The defender wants to audit n targets t_1, \dots, t_n , but has limited resources which allow for auditing only some of the n targets. Concretely, these resources could include time spent by human auditors, computational resources used for audit (e.g., automated log analysis), hardware (e.g., cameras) placed in strategic locations, among many other examples. The exact nature of these resources will depend on the specific audit problem considered. Rather than focusing on a specific type of audit, we denote resources available to the defender for audit as *inspection resources*. The defender has k *inspection resources* $\{s_1, \dots, s_k\}$ at her disposal, with $k < n$. Each inspection resource can be used to audit at most one target. Inspection resources are further constrained by the set of targets that they can audit: for instance, a human auditor may not have the expertise or authority to audit certain targets. We define a set of tuples R such that a tuple $(j, i) \in R$ indicates that inspection resource s_j cannot be used to audit target t_i .

A pure action of the defender chooses the allocation of inspection resources to targets. A randomized strategy is given by a probability distribution over pure actions. We use a compact form to represent a randomized strategy as a matrix of probabilities, with p_i^j the probability of inspection resource s_j auditing target t_i subject to the following constraints

$$p_i = \sum_{j=1}^k p_i^j \leq 1, \quad \sum_{i=1}^n p_i^j \leq 1 \quad \text{for all } i, j \text{ and} \\ p_i^j = 0 \text{ for all } (j, i) \in R \text{ and } \forall (j, i). p_i^j \geq 0,$$

where p_i denotes the probability that target t_i is inspected. These constraints can be represented as *grid constraints* as follows:

	t_1	\dots	t_n		
s_1	p_1^1	\dots	\dots	p_1^n	$\sum_i p_i^1 \leq 1$
\dots	\dots	\dots	\dots	\dots	\dots
\dots	\dots	\dots	\dots	\dots	\dots
s_k	p_1^k	\dots	\dots	p_n^k	$\sum_i p_i^k \leq 1$
	$\sum_j p_1^j \leq 1$	\dots	\dots	$\sum_j p_n^j \leq 1$	

Such a matrix can be decomposed into pure actions efficiently. (See the full version for the Birkhoff-von Neumann (1946) result presented in Korzhyk et al. (2010), which enables the decomposition.) Furthermore, for every distribution over pure actions we can define an “equivalent” strategy using our compact representation: the distributions will be equivalent in the sense that for every target t_i the probability p_i that that target is inspected is the same.

Similarly to the basic audit games model of Blocki et al. (2013), the defender also chooses a punishment “rate” $x \in [0, 1]$ such that if auditing detects an attack (i.e., violation), the attacker is fined an amount x . The adversary attacks one target such that given the defender’s strategy the adversary’s choice of attack is the best response.

We follow the notations of earlier papers on security games: let the utility of the defender be $U_D^a(t_i)$ when audited target t_i was found to be attacked, and $U_D^u(t_i)$ when unaudited target t_i was found to be attacked. We assume

that the attacks on unaudited targets are discovered by an external source. Similarly, define the utility of the attacker as $U_A^a(t_i)$ when the attacked target t_i is audited, and $U_A^u(t_i)$ when attacked target t_i is not audited, excluding any punishment imposed by the defender. Attacks discovered externally are costly for the defender, thus, $U_D^a(t_i) \geq U_D^u(t_i)$. Similarly, attacks not discovered by internal audits are more beneficial to the attacker, thus, $U_A^a(t_i) \geq U_A^u(t_i)$.

We can now define the full utility functions. The probabilities p_1, \dots, p_n of each target being audited are given by $p_i = \sum_{j=1}^k p_i^j$. Then, the utility of the defender when target t_* is attacked is $p_* U_D^a(t_*) + (1 - p_*) U_D^u(t_*) - ax$. The defender pays a fixed cost ax regardless of the outcome, where a is a constant. The losses captured by the $-ax$ term includes loss due to creation of a fearful work environment and cost incurred in maintaining a surplus of employees in anticipation of suspension. In the same scenario, the utility of the attacker when target t_* is attacked is $p_*(U_A^a(t_*) - x) + (1 - p_*)U_A^u(t_*)$. The attacker suffers punishment x only when attacking an audited target.

A possible extension of the model above is to account for immediate losses that the defender suffers by imposing a punishment, e.g., firing or suspending an employee requires time and effort to find a replacement. Mathematically, we can account for such losses by including an additional term within the scope of p_* in the payoff of the defender: $p_*(U_D^a(t_*) - a_1x) + (1 - p_*)U_D^u(t_*) - ax$, where a_1 is a constant. All our results (FPT and FPTAS algorithms) can be readily extended to handle this model extension, which we present in the full version.

Equilibrium. Under the Stackelberg equilibrium solution, the defender commits to a (randomized) strategy, followed by a best response by the adversary; the defender's strategy should maximize her utility. The mathematical problem involves solving multiple optimization problems, one each for the case when attacking t_* is in fact the best response of the adversary. Thus, assuming t_* is the best response of the adversary, the $*^{th}$ optimization problem P_* in our audit games setting is

$$\begin{aligned} \max_{p_{i,j},x} \quad & p_* U_D^a(t_*) + (1 - p_*) U_D^u(t_*) - ax, \\ \text{subject to} \quad & \forall i \neq *, p_i(U_A^a(t_i) - x) + (1 - p_i)U_A^u(t_i) \\ & \leq p_*(U_A^a(t_*) - x) + (1 - p_*)U_A^u(t_*), \\ & \forall j, 0 \leq \sum_{i=1}^n p_i^j \leq 1, \\ & \forall i, 0 \leq p_i = \sum_{j=1}^k p_i^j \leq 1, \forall (j, i), p_i^j \geq 0, \\ & \forall (j, i) \in R, p_i^j = 0, \quad 0 \leq x \leq 1. \end{aligned}$$

The first constraint verifies that attacking t_* is indeed a best response for the adversary.

The auditor solves the n problems P_1, \dots, P_n (which correspond to the cases where the best response is t_1, \dots, t_n , respectively), and chooses the best among all these solutions to obtain the final strategy to be used for auditing. This is a generalization of the multiple LPs approach of Conitzer and Sandholm (2006).

For ease of notation, let $\Delta_{D,i} = U_D^a(t_i) - U_D^u(t_i)$, $\Delta_i = U_A^a(t_i) - U_A^u(t_i)$ and $\delta_{i,j} = U_A^u(t_i) - U_A^u(t_j)$. Then, $\Delta_{D,i} \geq 0$, $\Delta_i \geq 0$, and the objective can be written as $p_n \Delta_{D,*} - ax$,

subject to the quadratic constraint

$$p_i(-x - \Delta_i) + p_n(x + \Delta_*) + \delta_{i,*} \leq 0.$$

Without loss of generality we will focus on the n 'th program P_n , that is, we let $*$ be n .

Inputs. The inputs to the above problem are specified in K bit precision. Thus, the total length of all inputs is $O(nK)$.

3 Fixed-Parameter Tractable Algorithms

In this section, we present our FPT algorithm for optimization problem P_n , followed by the optimization transformation that improves the FPT algorithm and enables the FPTAS in the next section. Finally, we briefly describe an extension of our algorithmic results to target-specific punishments.

We start with the FPT for P_n . Our algorithm is based on the following straightforward observation: if we fix the punishment level x then the P_n becomes a linear program that can be solved in polynomial time. We therefore solve the optimization problem P_n for discrete values of x (with interval size ϵ) and take the solution that maximizes the defender's utility. This approach provides the following guarantee:

Theorem 1. *The above approach of solving for discrete values of x is a FPT $\Theta(\epsilon)$ -additive approximation algorithm for the problem P_n if either the optimal value of x is greater than a small constant or $\Delta_n \neq 0$; the bit precision is the fixed parameter.*

Proof Sketch. The proof proceeds by arguing how much the objective changes when the value of x is changed by less than ϵ . The exact algebraic steps are in the full version. \square

We emphasize that fixing the bit precision is reasonable, because inputs to the game model are never known with certainty, and therefore high-precision inputs are not used in practice (see, e.g., Nguyen et al. (2014), Kiekintveld et al. (2013), Blum et al. (2014)).

A naïve approach to improving our FPT algorithm is to conduct a binary search on the punishment rate x . This approach may fail, though, as the solution quality is not single-peaked in x . We demonstrate this in the full version using an explicit example. Instead, we describe a transformation of the optimization problem, which will enable a FPTAS for our problem under certain restrictions.

3.1 Extracting constraints for p_i 's

The transformation eliminates variables p_i^j 's and instead extracts inequalities (constraints) for the variables p_i 's from the constraints below (referred to as grid constraints)

$$\begin{aligned} \forall i, 0 \leq p_i = \sum_{j=1}^k p_i^j \leq 1, \forall j, 0 \leq \sum_{i=1}^n p_i^j \leq 1, \\ \forall (j, i), p_i^j \geq 0, \forall (j, i) \in R, p_i^j = 0. \end{aligned}$$

Consider any subset of inspection resources L with the resources in L indexed by $s_1, \dots, s_{|L|}$ ($|L| \leq k$). We let $M = \text{OnlyAuditedBy}(L) \subset \{t_1, \dots, t_n\}$ denote the subset of targets that can only be audited by a resource in L (e.g., for every target $t_i \in M$ and every resource $s_j \notin L$ the resource s_j cannot inspect the target t_i). For notational convenience

we assume that M is indexed by $t_1, \dots, t_{|M|}$. Then, in case $|L| < |M|$, we obtain a constraint $p_{t_1} + \dots + p_{t_{|M|}} \leq |L|$ because there are only $|L|$ resources that could be used to audit these $|M|$ targets. We call such a constraint $c_{M,L}$. Consider the set of all such constraints C defined as

$$\{c_{M,L} \mid L \in 2^S, M = \text{OnlyAuditedBy}(L), |L| < |M|\}$$

where $S = \{s_1, \dots, s_k\}$ and $T = \{t_1, \dots, t_n\}$.

Lemma 1. *The optimization problem P_* is equivalent to the optimization problem obtained by replacing the grid constraints by $C \cup \{0 \leq p_i \leq 1\}$ in P_* .*

Proof Sketch. We present a sketch of the proof with the details in the full version. As the optimization objective depends on variables p_i 's only, and quadratic constraints are identical in both problems we just need to show that the regions spanned by the variables p_i 's, as specified by the linear constraints, are the same in both problems. As one direction of the inclusion is easy, we show the harder case below.

Let C^+ denote the convex polytope $C \cup \{0 \leq p_i \leq 1\}$. Given a point $(p_1, \dots, p_n) \in C^+$ we want to argue that we can find values p_i^j 's satisfying all of the grid constraints. We first note that it suffices to argue that we can find feasible p_i^j 's for any extreme point in C^+ because any point in C^+ can be written as a convex combination of its extreme points (Gallier 2008). Thus, we could find feasible p_i^j 's for any point in C^+ using this convex combination.

In the full version we prove that each extreme point in C^+ sets the variables p_1, \dots, p_n to 0 or 1. Let k' denote the number of ones in an extreme point. Note that $k' \leq k$ because one of the inequalities is $p_1 + \dots + p_n \leq k$. Consider the undirected bipartite graph linking the inspection nodes to the target nodes, with a link indicating that the inspection can audit the linked target. This graph is known from our knowledge of R , and each link in the graph can be labeled by one of the p_i^j variables. Let S' be the set of targets picked by the ones in any extreme points. We claim that there is a perfect matching from S' to the set of inspection resources (which we prove in next paragraph). Given such a perfect matching, assigning $p_i^j = 1$ for every edge in the matching yields a feasible solution, which completes the proof.

We prove the claim about perfect matching by contradiction. Assume there is no perfect matching, then there must be a set $S'' \subseteq S'$, such that $|N(S'')| < |S''|$ (N is the neighbors function — this result follows from Hall's theorem). As $S'' \subseteq S'$ it must hold that $p_i = 1$ for all $i \in \text{index}(S'')$ (function index gives the indices of the set of targets). Also, the set of targets S'' is audited only by inspection resources in $N(S'')$ and, by definition of C , we must have a constraint $\sum_{i \in \text{index}(S'')} p_i \leq |N(S'')|$. Using $|N(S'')| < |S''|$, we get $\sum_{i \in \text{index}(S'')} p_i < |S''|$. But, since $|\text{index}(S'')| = |S''|$, we conclude that all p_i for targets in S'' cannot be one, which is a contradiction. \square

Observe that obtaining p_i^j 's from the p_i 's involves solving a linear feasibility problem, which can be done efficiently.

Importantly, the definition of C is constructive and provides an algorithm to compute it. However, the algorithm has a worst-case running time exponential in k . Indeed, consider k resources s_1, \dots, s_k and $2k$ targets t_1, \dots, t_{2k} . Each resource s_i can inspect targets $t_1, t_2, t_{2i-1}, t_{2i}$. For each set of $k/2$ resources $L \subseteq \{s_2, \dots, s_k\}$ we have $M = \text{OnlyAuditedBy}(L) = \{t_1, t_2\} \cup \left(\bigcup_{s_j \in L} \{t_{2j-1}, t_{2j}\} \right)$. Observe that $|M| = k + 2 > k/2 = |L|$ so for each $L \subseteq \{s_2, \dots, s_k\}$ we get a new constraint $c_{M,L}$. Thus, we get $\binom{k-1}{k/2}$ constraints.

3.2 Conditions for Poly. Number of Constraints

Motivated by the above observation, we wish to explore an alternative method for computing C . We will also provide sufficient conditions under which $|C|$ is polynomial.

The intuition behind our alternative algorithm is that instead of iterating over sets of inspection resources, we could iterate over sets of targets. As a first step, we identify equivalent targets and merge them. Intuitively, targets that can be audited by the exact same set of inspections are equivalent. Formally, t_i and t_k are equivalent if $F(t_i) = F(t_k)$ where $F(t_\ell) = \{s_j \mid (j, \ell) \notin R\}$.

The algorithm is formally given as Algorithm 1. It builds an intersection graph from the merged targets: every merged set of targets is a node, and two nodes are linked if the two sets of inspection resources corresponding to the nodes intersect. The algorithm iterates through every connected induced sub-graph and builds constraints from the targets associated with the nodes in the sub-graphs and the set of inspection resources associated with them. The next lemma proves the correctness of the Algorithm 1.

Algorithm 1: CONSTRAINT_FIND(T, R)

```

Compute  $F$ , the map from  $T$  to  $2^{\{s_1, \dots, s_k\}}$  using  $R$ .
Merge targets with same  $F(t)$  to get set  $T'$  and a map
 $W$ , where  $W(t') = \#\text{merged targets that yielded } t'$ 
Let  $PV(t')$  be the set of prob. variables associated with
 $t'$ , one each from the merged targets that yielded  $t'$ 
Form an intersection graph  $G$  with nodes  $t' \in T'$  and
edge set  $E = \{\{t'_i, t'_k\} \mid F(t'_i) \cap F(t'_k) \neq \emptyset\}$ 
 $L \leftarrow \text{CONNECTEDSUBGRAPHS}(G)$ 
 $C \leftarrow \phi$ 
for  $l \in L$  do
    Let  $V$  be all the vertices in  $l$ 
     $P \leftarrow \bigcup_{v \in V} PV(v)$ 
     $k \leftarrow \sum_{v \in V} W(t')$ 
    if  $|P| > k$  then
         $C \leftarrow C \cup \{\sum_{p \in P} p \leq k\}$ 
return  $C$ 

```

Lemma 2. *CONSTRAINT_FIND outputs constraints that define the same convex polytope in p_1, \dots, p_n as the constraints output by the naïve algorithm (iterating over all subsets of resources).*

The proof appears in the full version. The algorithm is clearly not polynomial time in general, because it iterates over all connected subgraphs. The next lemma provides sufficient conditions for polynomial running time.

Lemma 3. `CONSTRAINT_FIND` runs in polynomial time if at least one of the following conditions holds:

- The intersection graph has $O(\log n)$ nodes.
- The intersection graph has constant maximum degree and a constant number of nodes with degree at least 3.

Proof Sketch. The detailed proof is in the full version. It is not hard to observe that we need sufficient conditions for any graph to have polynomially many induced connected subgraphs. The first case above is obvious as the number of induced connected sub-graphs in the worst case (fully connected graph) is 2^N , where N is number of nodes. The second case can be proved by an induction on the number of nodes in the graphs with degree greater than 3. Removing any such vertex results in a constant number of disconnected components (due to constant max degree). Then, we can argue that the number of connected sub-graphs of the given graph will scale polynomially with the max number of connected sub-graphs of each component. The base case involves graphs of degree less than two, which is a graph with paths and cycles and such a graph has polynomially many connected sub-graphs. \square

Why Are These Conditions Realistic? The conditions specified in Lemma 3 capture a wide range of practical audit scenarios.

First, many similar targets can often be grouped together by type. In a hospital case, for instance, rather than considering each individual health record as a unique target worthy of specific audit strategies, it might make more sense to have identical audit policies for a small set of patient types (e.g., celebrities, regular folks...). Likewise, in the context of tax audits, one could envisage that individuals are pooled according to their types (e.g., high income earners, expatriates, ...). In practice, we expect to see only a few different types. Each type corresponds to a single node in the intersection graph, so that a constant number of types corresponds to a constant number of nodes. That is, both of the lemma conditions are satisfied, even though only one is required.

Second, auditing is often localized. For instance, when considering audits performed by corporate managers, one would expect these managers to primarily inspect the activities of their direct subordinates. This means that the inspection resources (inspection actions of a manager) auditing a node (activities of its subordinates) are disjoint from the inspection resources auditing any other node. Thus, our intersection graph has no edges, and the second lemma condition is satisfied. Slightly more complex situations, where, for instance, employees' activities are audited by two different managers, still satisfy the second condition.

3.3 Target-Specific Punishments

We present a brief overview of target-specific punishments with the details in the full version. We extend our model to

target-specific punishments by augmenting the program P_n : we use individual punishment levels x_1, \dots, x_n , instead of using the same punishment x for each target. The new optimization problem PX_n differs from P_n only in (1) objective: $\max_{p_i, x} p_n \Delta_{D,n} - \sum_{j \in \{1, \dots, n\}} a_j x_j$ and (2) quadratic constraints: $p_i(-x_i - \Delta_i) + p_n(x_n + \Delta_n) + \delta_{i,n} \leq 0$.

The naive way of discretizing each of the variables x_1, \dots, x_n and solving the resulting sub-problems is not polynomial time. Nevertheless, we show that it is possible to design an FPT approximation algorithm by discretizing only p_n , and casting the resulting sub-problems as second-order cone programs (SOCP), which can be solved in polynomial time (Boyd and Vandenberghe 2004). We first present the following intuitive result:

Lemma 4. At the optimal point for PX_n , x_n is always 0. Further, discretizing values of p_n with interval size ϵ and solving resulting sub-problems yields a $\Theta(\epsilon)$ approximation.

The proof is in the full version. Next, we show that for fixed values of x_n and p_n , PX_n reduces to an SOCP. We first describe a general SOCP problem (with variable $y \in \mathbb{R}^n$) that maximizes a linear objective $f^T y$ subject to linear constraints $Fy = g$ and m quadratic constraints of the form

$$\forall i \in \{1, \dots, m\}. \|A_i y + b_i\|_2 \leq c_i^T y + d_i$$

In particular, the constraint $k^2/4 \leq y_i(y_j + k')$ is the same as $\|[k(y_i - y_j - k')]\|_2 \leq y_i + y_j + k$, which is an instance of the quadratic constraint above for appropriate A, b, c, d .

Our problem can be cast as an SOCP by rewriting the quadratic constraints as

$$p_n(x_n + \Delta_n) + \delta_{i,n} \leq p_i(x_i + \Delta_i)$$

Using our approach (discretizing p_n , $x_n = 0$) the LHS of the above inequality is a constant. If the constant is negative we can simply throw out the constraint — it is a tautology since the RHS is always positive. If the constant is positive, we rewrite the constraint as a second-order constraint as described above (e.g., set $k = 2\sqrt{p_n(x_n + \Delta_n) + \delta_{i,n}}$ and set $k' = \Delta_i$). The rest of the constraints are linear. Thus, the problem for each fixed value of p_n, x_n is an SOCP. Putting everything together, we have proved the following result.

Theorem 2. The method described above is an FPT additive $\Theta(\epsilon)$ -approximate algorithm for solving PX_n .

4 Fully Polynomial Time Approximation

Our goal in this section is to develop an FPTAS for problem P_n , under the condition that the set C returned by `CONSTRAINT_FIND` has polynomially many constraints. Our algorithm builds on an earlier algorithm (Blocki et al. 2013) for the restricted auditing scenario with just one defender resource. Since we solve the defender's problem after extracting the constraints C , the variables in our problem are just the p_i 's and x .

$$\begin{aligned} & \max_{p_i, x} && p_n \Delta_{D,n} - ax, \\ & \text{subject to} && \forall i \neq n. \\ & && p_i(-x - \Delta_i) + p_n(x + \Delta_n) + \delta_{i,n} \leq 0, \\ & && c \in C, \forall i. 0 \leq p_i \leq 1, \quad 0 \leq x \leq 1. \end{aligned}$$

Property of optimal points. We state the following property of some optimal points p_i^* 's and x^* of the optimization:

Lemma 5. *There exists optimal points p_i^* 's and x^* such that if $p_n^*(x^* + \Delta_n) + \delta_{j,n} \geq 0$ then $p_n^*(x^* + \Delta_n) + \delta_{j,n} = p_j^*(x^* + \Delta_j)$ (i.e., quadratic constraint is tight) else when $p_n^*(x^* + \Delta_n) + \delta_{j,n} < 0$ then $p_j^* = 0$.*

Proof Sketch. The quadratic constraint can be written as $\frac{p_n(x+\Delta_n)+\delta_{j,n}}{x+\Delta_i} \leq p_i$. At the optimal point if $p_n^*(x^* + \Delta_n) + \delta_{j,n} \geq 0$ then if we have $\frac{p_n^*(x^*+\Delta_n)+\delta_{j,n}}{x+\Delta_i} < p_i^*$, we can always reduce p_i^* without affecting the objective value till we get an equality. Also, for the case $p_n^*(x^* + \Delta_n) + \delta_{j,n} < 0$ we can reduce p_i^* to 0. \square

We focus on finding one of the optimal points with the property stated above. Next, we sort $\delta_{i,n}$'s to get a sorted array $\delta_{(i),n}$ in ascending order. Then, we split the optimization problem P_n into sub-problems $EQ_{(j)}$, where in each problem $EQ_{(j)}$ it is assumed that p_n, x lies between the hyperbolas $p_n(x + \Delta_n) + \delta_{(j),n}$ (open boundary) and $p_n(x + \Delta_n) + \delta_{(j+1),n}$ (closed boundary) in the plane spanned by p_n, x . Thus, in $EQ_{(j)}$, $p_n(x + \Delta_n) + \delta_{(j),n}$ is non-negative for all $(k) > (j)$ and negative otherwise. Using the property of the optimal point above, for the non-negative case we obtain equalities for the quadratic constraints and for the negative case we claim that for all $(k) \leq (j)$ we can set $p_{(k)} = 0$. The optimal value for P_n can be found by solving each $EQ_{(j)}$ and taking the best solution from these sub-problems.

The optimization problem for $EQ_{(j)}$ is as follows:

$$\begin{aligned} \max_{p_i, x} \quad & p_n \Delta_{D,n} - ax, \\ \text{subject to} \quad & \forall (i) > (j). 0 \leq \frac{p_n(x+\Delta_n)+\delta_{(i),n}}{x+\Delta_{(i)}} = p_{(i)} \leq 1 \\ & p_n(x + \Delta_n) + \delta_{(j),n} < 0 \\ & p_n(x + \Delta_n) + \delta_{(j+1),n} \geq 0 \\ & c \in C, \forall (i) \leq (j). p_{(i)} = 0, \quad 0 \leq x \leq 1. \end{aligned}$$

As no p_i (except p_n) appears in the objective, and due to the equality constraints on particular p_i 's, we can replace those p_i 's by a function of p_n, x . Other p_i 's are zero. Next, by a series of simple algebraic manipulations we obtain a two-variable optimization problem:

$$\begin{aligned} \max_{p_i, x} \quad & p_n \Delta_{D,n} - ax, \\ \text{subject to} \quad & \forall b \in \{1, \dots, B\}. p_n \leq f_b(x) \\ & 0 \leq p_n \leq 1, \quad 0 \leq x \leq 1, \end{aligned}$$

where B is the total number of constraints, which is of the same order as $|C|$. The details of the algebraic steps are in the full version.

Solving the sub-problem. Our two final lemmas are not hard to prove. Their proofs appear in the full version.

Lemma 6. *Problem $EQ_{(j)}$ can be solved efficiently for a fixed value x or fixed value of p_n .*

Lemma 7. *The optimal point for EQ_j cannot be an interior point of the region defined by the constraints, i.e., at least one of the inequalities is tight for the optimal point.*

Proof Sketch. It is easy to see that if all constraints are non-tight at the optimal point, then p_n can be increased by a small amount without violating any constraint and also increasing the objective value. Thus, some constraint must be tight. \square

Algorithm 2: APX_SOLVE($l, EQ_{(j)}$)

```

Solve the problem for  $p_n = 0, 1$  and  $x = 0, 1$ 
Collect solutions  $(p_n, x)$  from the above in  $M$ 
for  $b \leftarrow 1$  to  $B$  do
    Replace  $p_n = f_b(x)$  in the objective to get
     $F(x) = f_b(x)\Delta_{D,n} - ax$ 
    Take the derivative to get  $F'(x) = \frac{\partial F(x)}{\partial x}$ 
     $R \leftarrow \text{ROOTS}(F'(x), 2^{-l}, (0, 1))$ 
     $R' \leftarrow \text{MAKEFEASIBLE}(R)$ 
    From  $R'$  obtain set  $M'$  of potential solutions  $(p_n, x)$ 
     $M \leftarrow M \cup M'$ 
for  $(b, b') \in \{(b, b') \mid b \in B, b' \in B, b' > b\}$  do
    Equate  $f_b(x) = f_{b'}(x)$  to get  $F(x) = 0$ 
     $R \leftarrow \text{ROOTS}(F(x), 2^{-l}, (0, 1))$ 
     $R' \leftarrow \text{MAKEFEASIBLE}(R)$ 
    From  $R$  obtain set  $M'$  of potential solutions  $(p_n, x)$ 
     $M \leftarrow M \cup M'$ 
 $(p_n^*, x^*) \leftarrow \arg \max_M \{p_n \Delta_{D,n} - ax\}$ 
return  $(p_n^*, x^*)$ 

```

We are now ready to present the FPTAS, given as Algorithm 2. The algorithm first searches potential optimal points on the boundaries (in the first loop) and then searches potential optimal points at the intersection of two boundaries (second loop). The roots are found to an additive approximation factor of 2^{-l} in time polynomial in the size of the problem representation and l (Schönhage 1982). As shown in Blocki et al. (2013), the case of roots lying outside the feasible region (due to approximation) is taken care of by the function MAKEFEASIBLE. The first loop iterates a maximum of n times, and the second loop iterates a maximum of $\binom{n}{2}$ times. Thus, we have the following result.

Theorem 3. *The optimization problem P_n can be solved with an additive approximation factor of $\Theta(2^{-l})$ in time polynomial in the input size and l , i.e., our algorithm to solve P_n is an FPTAS.*

5 Experimental Results

In this section, we empirically demonstrate the speedup gains from our optimization transformation for both audit games and security games. We obtained speedups of up to $3\times$ for audit game instances and over $100\times$ for associated security game instances.

Our experiments were run on a desktop with quad core 3.2 GHz processor and 6GB RAM. Code was written in Matlab using the built-in large scale interior point method implementation of linear programming. We implemented two FPT algorithms—with and without the optimization transformation. For both the algorithms, we used the same problem inputs in which utilities were generated randomly from

Game	#Target	#Resource (GroupSize)	Time (min)	
			T	NT
Audit	100	10 (2)	12	15
Audit	200	100 (10)	81	234
Security	3,000	500 (10)	28	8,500 ¹
Security	5,000	1,000 (20)	119	110,000 ¹

Table 1: FPT algorithm running times (in min) with our optimization transformation (T) and no transformation (NT).

the range $[0, 1]$, a was fixed to 0.01, x was discretized with interval size of 0.005.

We ran experiments for audit games and security games with varying number of targets and resources. The resources were divided into equal sized groups such that the targets any group of resources could inspect was disjoint from the target set for any other group. Table 1 shows our results with the varying number of targets, resources and size of the group of targets. The results are an average over 5 runs of the optimization with random utilities in each run. Audit games take more time to solve than corresponding security games with a similar number of targets as we run the corresponding LP optimization 200 times (the discrete interval for x is 0.005). Hence we solve for larger security game instances.

Our implementations did not optimize for speed using heuristics because our goal was to only test the speedup gain from our optimization transformation. Thus, we do not scale up to the number of targets that heuristic approaches such as ORIGAMI (Kiekintveld et al. 2009) achieve (1,000,000 targets). ORIGAMI works by iteratively building the optimal attack set, i.e., the set of targets that the adversary finds most attractive at the optimal solution point. However, ORIGAMI considers only coverage probabilities (marginals). Thus, its output may not be implementable with scheduling constraints on resources. In contrast, our approach guarantees that the coverage probabilities output are implementable. Wedding the two approaches to obtain scalable and provably implementable audit and security game solutions remains an interesting direction for future work.

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¹These data points are extrapolations from runs that were allowed to run 12 hours. The extrapolation was based on the number of optimization problems solved vs the total number of optimization problems (3000/5000 total problems for 3000/5000 targets).

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