AAAI Publications, Workshops at the Twenty-Eighth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence

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Program Equilibrium in the Prisoner's Dilemma via Löb's Theorem
Patrick LaVictoire, Benja Fallenstein, Eliezer Yudkowsky, Mihaly Barasz, Paul Christiano, Marcello Herreshoff

Last modified: 2014-06-18


Applications of game theory often neglect that real-world agents normally have some amount of out-of-band information about each other. We consider the limiting case of a one-shot Prisoner's Dilemma between algorithms with read-access to one anothers' source code. Previous work has shown that cooperation is possible at a Nash equilibrium in this setting, but existing constructions require interacting agents to be identical or near-identical. We show that a natural class of agents are able to achieve mutual cooperation at Nash equilibrium without any prior coordination of this sort.


Prisoner's Dilemma; program equilibrium; provability logic; Lob's Theorem

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