Partners in Crime: Manipulating the Deferred Acceptance Algorithm through an Accomplice

Authors

  • Theodora Bendlin Rochester Institute of Technology
  • Hadi Hosseini Rochester Institute of Technology

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v33i01.33019917

Abstract

We introduce a new manipulation strategy available to women in the men-proposing stable matching, called manipulation through an accomplice. In this strategy, a woman can team up with a potential male “accomplice” who manipulates on her behalf to obtain a better match for her. We investigate the stability of the matching obtained after this manipulation, provide an algorithm to compute such strategies, and show its benefit compared to single-woman manipulation strategies.

Downloads

Published

2019-07-17

How to Cite

Bendlin, T., & Hosseini, H. (2019). Partners in Crime: Manipulating the Deferred Acceptance Algorithm through an Accomplice. Proceedings of the AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence, 33(01), 9917-9918. https://doi.org/10.1609/aaai.v33i01.33019917

Issue

Section

Student Abstract Track