Using Game Theory for Los Angeles Airport Security

Authors

  • James Pita University of Southern California
  • Manish Jain University of Southern California
  • Fernando Ordóñez University of Southern California
  • Christopher Portway University of Southern California
  • Milind Tambe University of Southern California
  • Craig Western University of Southern California
  • Praveen Paruchuri Intelligent Automation, Inc.
  • Sarit Kraus Bar Ilan University and University of Maryland

DOI:

https://doi.org/10.1609/aimag.v30i1.2173

Abstract

Security at major locations of economic or political importance is a key concern around the world, particularly given the threat of terrorism. Limited security resources prevent full security coverage at all times, which allows adversaries to observe and exploit patterns in selective patrolling or monitoring, e.g. they can plan an attack avoiding existing patrols. Hence, randomized patrolling or monitoring is important, but randomization must provide distinct weights to different actions based on their complex costs and benefits. To this end, this paper describes a promising transition of the latest in multi-agent algorithms into a deployed application. In particular, it describes a software assistant agent called ARMOR (Assistant for Randomized Monitoring over Routes) that casts this patrolling/monitoring problem as a Bayesian Stackelberg game, allowing the agent to appropriately weigh the different actions in randomization, as well as uncertainty over adversary types. ARMOR combines two key features: (i) It uses the fastest known solver for Bayesian Stackelberg games called DOBSS, where the dominant mixed strategies enable randomization; (ii) Its mixed-initiative based interface allows users to occasionally adjust or override the automated schedule based on their local constraints. ARMOR has been successfully deployed since August 2007 at the Los Angeles International Airport (LAX) to randomize checkpoints on the roadways entering the airport and canine patrol routes within the airport terminals. This paper examines the information, design choices, challenges, and evaluation that went into designing ARMOR.

Author Biographies

James Pita, University of Southern California

Graduate Student

Computer Science Department

Viterbi School of Engineering

University of Southern California

 

Manish Jain, University of Southern California

Graduate Student

Computer Science Department

Viterbi School of Engineering

University of Southern California

 

Fernando Ordóñez, University of Southern California

Associate Professor

Joint appointment: Daniel J. Epstein Department of Industrial and Systems Engineering, and Computer Science Department

Viterbi School of Engineering

University of Southern Calfornia

Christopher Portway, University of Southern California

Undergraduate Student

Computer Science Department

Viterbi School of Engineering

University of Southern California

 

Milind Tambe, University of Southern California

Professor

Computer Science Department

Viterbi School of Engineering

University of Southern California

Craig Western, University of Southern California

Undergraduate Student

Computer Science Department

Viterbi School of Engineering

University of Southern California

Praveen Paruchuri, Intelligent Automation, Inc.

Research Scientist

Intelligent Automation, Inc.

Rockville, MD 20855

Sarit Kraus, Bar Ilan University and University of Maryland

Professor

Computer Science Department

Bar-Ilan University

Adjunct Professor

Institute for Advanced Computer Studies

University of Marlyand

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Published

2009-01-18

How to Cite

Pita, J., Jain, M., Ordóñez, F., Portway, C., Tambe, M., Western, C., Paruchuri, P., & Kraus, S. (2009). Using Game Theory for Los Angeles Airport Security. AI Magazine, 30(1), 43. https://doi.org/10.1609/aimag.v30i1.2173

Issue

Section

Articles